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This paper was originally prepared as a contribution to 
a  project,  funded  by  ACIAR  (PN9228),  on  China's 
grain markets and their regional integration. The paper 
deserves an even wider audience. 
One of the objectives of the ACIAR project was to 
comment on current policy  issues in  grain marketing 
reform in  China.  Australia's experience of the devel-
opment of grain marketing arrangements was of great 
interest to the Chinese collaborators in the project. 
They  sought  a review of the  history  of the  devel-
opment of grain marketing arrangements in  Australia 
and a commentary on the issues that emerged. 
They  sought  also  a  brief commentary  on  lessons 
which China might take from that experience. 
Or Watson, a freelance economist now based in Mel-
bourne,  Australia,  was  commissioned to  prepare  this 
paper  for  that  purpose.  Previously  he  held  senior 
positions in  the School of Agriculture and Forestry at 
the  University  of Melbourne  and  in  the  Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics. His 
research interests have included grain marketing, wool 
marketing,  irrigation  policy  and  the  interaction  of 
domestic and  international  policies affecting the agri-
cultural sector. 
The paper stresses the importance of efficient mech-
anisms for price discovery in agricultural markets and 
the  importance  of  transport  in  developing  efficient 
domestic  and  international  marketing  systems.  It 
shows how stabilisation objectives can be negated by 
macroeconomic developments or international events 
that affect an economy via its external accounts. The 
report also highlights aspects of storage, and examines 
with some care the role of futures markets. 
Of particular interest to our Chinese colleagues was 
the analysis in the paper of the nature and functions of 
markets. They were also interested in the detail of: 
•  the history of the role of the Australian Wheat Board 
in the export market; 
functions  of  the  Australian  grain  handling 
authorities; and 
the  effects  of  the  pricing  formulas  used  before 
domestic market deregulation. 
I would like to thank Or Watson for his willingness 
to  take  on  this  task  and  for  his  contribution  to  the 
project, both through the preparation of this paper and 
through his commentary on some of the work to date. 
I want also to acknowledge the support of ACIAR 
staff for this publication, including that of our project 
coordinator Or Padma Lal and the editorial input and 
design of  Arawang Inforn1ation Bureau. 
Christopher Findlay 
Chinese Economy Research Unit 
University of  Adelaide 
March 1996 
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Production, consumption and domestic  trade in  grains 
are important to both China and Australia, but there are 
fundamental differences in their agricultural economies. 
Nowadays,  only  3%  of  Australia's  gross  domestic 
product  comes  from  the  farm  sector,  about  equally 
divided between crops and livestock products. National 
income is measured differently in China (Cheng 1993). 
Consequently, a more convenient way of distinguishing 
the  agricultural  systems  of China and  Australia  is  to 
compare  the  distribution  of the  population  and  work 
force. 
Around 80% of the population of China is  rural and 
only 20% live in urban areas. In Australia, those propor-
tions are roughly reversed. Moreover. only about 5% of 
total  employment is  provided within  the  farm  sector. 
Around  70%  of employment  in  China  is  in  farming, 
forestry,  animal  husbandry  and  fisheries.  In  China, 
almost  60% of the  total  value of agricultural output, 
which  under the Chinese definition  includes sidelines 
and  village-run  industrial  enterprises,  is  from  crops, 
about four times the  value of output from animal hus-
bandry. Around one third of the total Chinese working 
population is engaged in the production of  crops. This is 
around twenty times the proportion in Australia. 
International trade in grain is a significant factor in 
world  commerce,  with  trade  between  Australia  and 
China in wheat and other grains of considerable impor-
tance  to  both countries. The grains industries are so 
important  in  both  countries  that  it is  impossible  to 
discuss  grain  marketing  adequately,  without  intro-
ducing  some  general  questions  of agricultural  and 
economic policy. A broad definition of grains is used 
in  this paper to embrace cereals, oil seeds, pulses and 
grain  legumes  that  can  be  used,  usually  with  only 
limited further processing, either for direct human con-
sumption  or  as  feed  grains  in  the  production  of 
livestock products. 
The  grain  industries  in  Australia  have  several 
features  that  distinguish  them  from  those  of other 
countries.  Crops  are  produced  on large  commercial 
farms  under dry land conditions,  with only  a limited 
amount  of  irrigation  in  a  few  regions.  Generally 
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speaking, grain production in  Australia is  not  a spe-
cialised activity.  A number of grains will  usually  be 
grown in  rotation. Moreover, grain production is also 
most often associated with livestock production, par-
ticularly sheep for wool  production. Wheat is  by  far 
the most important grain product. 
Compared  with  North  America and  Europe,  feed 
grains are unimportant, for two climatic reasons: 
•  The major livestock industries of Australia are based 
on year-round grazing. Sheep and cattle do not have 
to be housed in winter. Grass-based meat production 
is cheap. 
•  The climate is unsuitable for large-scale production 
of maize (corn) and soybean, two major crops used 
in the intensive .livestock industries and important in 
world trade in grains. 
With increasing incomes and changes in consumer 
diets,  usually  increasing consumption of meat,  feed 
grains have gradually become more significant in the 
agricultural systems of many countries. Though there 
has been a relative decline in the direct consumption of 
traditional staples like wheat and rice in developed and 
developing  countries,  grain  production  and  other 
grain-based  farming  industries  remain  economically 
and politically important in  many countries. Australia 
is  no  exception  in  this  respect  (Whitwell  and 
Sydenham 1991). 
Particular attention is given in  this  paper to  major 
factors  influencing  the  way  policy  and  marketing 
arrangements  might  be  organised  in  China  and 
Australia to take advantage of opportunities presented 
by  the  world  market. The major supply and demand 
factors operating in  world markets for grain are  rea-
sonably well known. However, many of those factors 
have recently been subject to change. It is important to 
identify aspects of the economic and marketing envi-
ronment which have changed in ways which challenge 
the rationale on which earlier grain marketing policies 
of China and Australia were based, and consider other 
changes that may occur in the future. 
Agricultural  marketing is  a  topic of interest  for  a 
number of  reasons. In this paper, there is an underlying concern  with  matters  to  do  with  economic  coordi-
nation. The regional diversity of the grain industries of 
China  and  Australia  is  considerable  with  respect  to 
both production and  markets. This creates a profound 
need  for  the  provision of economic  information  and 
transport resources to coordinate grain  production  in 
space and time. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
The next section provides some background to the 
issues being discussed in subsequent sections. The first 
issue  considered briefly  is  the  role of government in 
marketing  in  both  China and  Australia.  In  the  next 
sub-section of the  paper,  an  important distinction  is 
drawn  between  the disciplines  of price  analysis and 
marketing analysis which are  applied throughout the 
paper to a variety of problems of the grain industry. A 
further distinction is then  made  between government 
action intended to 'assist' producers and that intended 
to  'regulate' agricultural markets. This section of the 
paper is concluded with some comments on the role of 
economic  information-an important theme revisited 
at various points. 
The  third  section  of the  paper  discusses  various 
approaches to agricultural marketing. Following from 
the  significance  of direct  consumption  of grain  by 
producers in China and the rapid transition to  a more 
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cash-based and market-oriented agricultural economy, 
the  emphasis  is  more  on  retail/wholesale aspects  of 
marketing than  would  be  considered appropriate for 
Australia, where interest in grain marketing generally 
ceases  with sale of grain to domestic processors,  or 
agents in importing countries. The distinction rests on 
who is considered to  be the principal customer in each 
situation. 
The fourth section of the paper outlines the history 
of marketing  and pricing arrangements  for  the  Aus-
tralian  grains  industry,  with emphasis on wheat. The 
grain  marketing  system  is  now  subject  to  gradual 
deregulation, which is  connected to general political 
and economic  developments  in  Australia as  well  as 
recognition of  the earlier problems of grain marketing. 
The fifth  section discusses marketing functions  in 
the context of grain marketing in Australia and China. 
The topics discussed are as follows: 
•  futures  markets,  as  instruments of price  discovery 
and risk management; 
•  buying and selling arrangements; 
•  grading; 
•  storage-public and private. 
The  penultimate  section  discusses  some  implica-
tions of the analysis for the situation of  the grain indus-
tries in China. Some concluding comments follow. Background 
Intervention by Government 
International trade in  food and feed grains is charac-
terised  by  substantial  concentration  amongst 
exporters  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  amongst  buying 
countries. The international grain trade is also charac-
terised by a substantial amount of intervention by the 
governments  of  the  key  exporting  and  importing 
countries  (Ryan  1994).  Government  policies  are 
directed towards both the domestic and international 
aspects of grain production. The intervention results 
in  economic policies that  assist or hinder grain pro-
duction,  deliberately  and  accidentally.  Generally 
speaking,  positive  assistance  to  agriculture  is  a 
feature of industrialised countries, where agriculture 
is  declining.  Many  developing  countries,  including 
China, have frequently penalised agriculture and the 
grain sector. 
At  other  times,  intervention  by  government  is 
directed towards  the conduct of internal and external 
trade  in  grain.  For  example.  Australia  and  Canada 
control  grain  exports  through  government  agencies 
(statutory  marketing  authorities  or  'boards').  Those 
authorities  most  often  trade  in  grain  on  their  own 
account, but may also sell grain to large multinational 
grain trading companies. rather than the final importer. 
Sales  of  Australian  wheat  made  through  trading 
companies are usually  to  known destinations. essen-
tially  involving  provision  of marketing  services  to 
established customers of the Australian Wheat Board 
(A  WB) rather than sales to optional destinations deter-
mined by the grain traders. 
The  United  States  relies  mainly  on  private 
companies to market grain, although U.S. trade is now 
often  assisted  by  export  subsidies  with  the  United 
States  Department  of  Agriculture  (USDA)  closely 
involved in marketing activities to subsidised destina-
tions.  Many  countries,  including  China,  use  central 
buying agencies to control the volume and terms and 
conditions of purchase for  grain  imports.  China also 
controls  grain  exports,  with  an  export  embargo 
imposed in 1994. 
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An  important feature of the world grain trade is  its 
instability.  With  many  countries  close to  self-suffi-
ciency,  weather-induced  fluctuations  in  output  have 
substantial effects on world prices and trade flows. As 
has been strikingly evident in recent years. with wide-
spread  drought  in  eastern  Australia.  Australian  pro-
duction  and  exports  are  particularly  vulnerable  to 
climatic variability. 
Around  20%  of the  550  million  or so  tonnes  of 
wheat produced annually enters world trade. Coupled 
with  the  small  population of Australia. this explains 
why  Australia,  whose  wheat  production  is  actually 
modest on an  international scale, is the fourth largest 
exporter  after  the  United  States,  Canada  and  the 
European  Union  and  is  of some  significance  in  the 
world wheat trade. Only around 4% of the around 500 
million  tonnes  (paddy  basis) of rice  produced enters 
world  trade. Rice is  the  'thin' market,  sine qua non. 
Australia produces only around one million tonnes of 
rice. about 80% of which is exported. The world rice 
market is important to the Australian rice industry, but 
not vice versa. 
Intervention in the world grain market arises for  a 
variety of  reasons: 
•  in  pursuit  of national  food  security  by  importing 
countries; 
•  in response to instability of production and prices, 
domestically and internationally; 
•  reflecting  the  ideology  of  mercantilism  which 
promotes exporting as an objective in its own right, 
irrespective of its cost; 
•  because  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  costs  of 
marketing and/or the economic behaviour of private 
marketing firms; 
•  as  a  planned  or  unplanned  consequence  of  the 
domestic  agricultural  policies  typical  of  rich 
countries, which were initially intended to offset the 
effects of economic growth and structural change in 
agriculture on their own farmers' incomes; 
•  as part of international aid programs associated with 
the relief of famines. or long-term food shortages in 
some countries; •  finally,  representing both a cause and an  effect of 
intervention.  in  the  attempt by  both exporting and 
importing  countries  to  turn  the  terms-of-trade  for 
grain in their favour. 
The two  main  issues  in  the  political  economy  of 
grain in Australia over many years have been: 
•  the  roles  of the  public  and  private  sector  in  the 
performance of marketing functions; 
•  the market power that can be achieved by statutory 
marketing boards. 
Stated  differently,  the  second  issue  concerns 
whether intervention increases prices received by pro-
ducers. This has also been rellected in the controversy 
over the  'weak selling' that was (is?) believed would 
occur if a large number of traders handled exports of 
grain (Piggott 1992). 
Chinese attitudes and concerns 
Analogous  policy  problems  obviously  exist  for 
China.  The  role  of government  in  grain  marketing 
needs to be established. The Chinese authorities have 
to  decide  which  marketing  arrangements  would 
enable China to acquire imports of grain on the best 
possible terms. In  the  past, China was also a signif-
icant  exporter  of grain  (rice  and  oilseeds).  This 
situation could occur again in  the  future.  Arguments 
about  selling  arrangements  for  grain  are  therefore 
relevant to Chinese policymakers, along with buying 
arrangements. 
In the last fifteen years, China has moved away from 
a  system  of agricultural  production  and  marketing 
based on communes, with rigid central planning and 
control, to a more decentralised and market-orientated 
system. China now has a mixed economy in its grain 
sector, with plan and market opemting in  production, 
marketing and consumption (Sicular 1988). Finding a 
balance  between  plan  and  market  is  a  challenge  to 
economic  analysis,  empirical  observation  and  expe-
rience,  not  to  mention  political  and  administrative 
subtlety in implementation of policies. 
Watson and  Findlay (1993, p.  I) have pointed out 
that: 
... reform of the grain marketing system has been among 
the slowest and most conservative of all the elements of 
the rural refonn process, and grain has been among the 
last  of the agricultural commodities to  be  fully  liber-
alised. This wariness was most clearly demonstrated by 
the stalling of grain refonn in the mid-1980s. It was not 
until the economic growth and structural changes of the 
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19805  had  become  consolidated  that  grain  market 
refonn began to move ahead again. 
In  the  event. the implementation of grain marketing 
refonn came very quickly, once the  initial steps were 
taken ... 
Given the radical changes now taking place in the 
Chinese grain economy, a fundamental concern of pol-
icy makers  is  the  distribution  of  the  benefits  of 
marketing reform. 
The  main  feature  of previous  policies  was  their 
emphasis  on  self-sufficiency  at  the  national,  pro-
vincial, regional and even the commune level (Lardy 
) 983).  By  and  large,  the  system  taxed  peasant 
producers  for  the  benefit  of  urban  consumers, 
impeding capital accumulation within agriculture and 
economic  growth  more  generally.  Nevertheless,  the 
pursuit  of  self-sufficiency  remains  a  powerful 
influence on Chinese policies at all levels of adminis-
tration. Policymakers in all countries have the habit of 
focusing on market shares in  trade, as if these market 
shares  should  be  an  objective of policy,  rather than 
emphasising  economic  efficiency  and  distributional 
questions in  production and marketing. Market shares 
are a useful descriptive or summary statistic of market 
developments but of no real significance to important 
questions of  economic policy. Increasing market share 
can  be  inconsistent  with  economic welfare.  Policies 
which  maintain  resources  in  declining  industries  or 
sectors. like subsidising exports, will  increase market 
share.  but  decrease  welfare.  Conversely,  large 
countries with market power would do better to restrict 
trade and lose market share. 
In effect, Chinese policy had turned its back on the 
gains from  regional specialisation in grain production 
based  on  the  idea  of comparative  advantage.  In  a 
country as vast and diverse as  China, this  involved a 
substantial economic cost, even accepting that  in  the 
past there were valid political reasons for attempting to 
achieve national self-sufficiency in grain. At the same 
time,  the  rigid  marketing  system  did  not  allow  the 
evolution  of methods of price discovery  and  devel-
opment of marketing infrastructure that would make it 
possible to balance inevitable short-term surpluses and 
deficits of grain  associated  with  climatic differences 
between  regions.  On  the  other hand, consistent  with 
the  idea of comparative advantage, Chinese policies 
have  long  sought to  balance  national  surpluses  and 
deficits in grain through international trade; exporting 
rice from the south, and supplying coastal and northern 
centres through imports of wheat. The Australian situation 
While  on-farm  production  decisions  in  Australia 
have always been essentially determined by  the indi-
vidual  decisions  of farmers,  grain  marketing,  which 
was  previously  subject  to  substantial  government 
control, is  now characterised by  a gradual process of 
deregulation. Moreover, prices received by Australian 
farmers are more closely connected with market forces 
on both the  domestic and  international markets than 
was  the  case  in  the  past.  Previously,  the  Australian 
grain marketing system did not allow establishment of 
premiums and discounts around the average price that 
reflected  differences  in  quality  or time of sale.  The 
storage,  transport  and  handling  system  for  the 
domestic  and  export  markets was  provided by  grain 
handling authorities,  usually owned and operated by 
State  governments.  In  South  Australia  and  Western 
Australia, grower co-operatives with special privileges 
under  State  legislation,  operated  the  handling  and 
storage system. 
Changes  to  grain  marketing  in  Australia  in  1989 
deregulated the domestic market for wheat and other 
grains. Export marketing is still  under the control of 
statutory  authorities.  The  previous  system  gave 
farmers  no discretion in  marketing. Farmers are now 
able to store grain on farms and make judgments about 
when,  where and to  whom production is  sold on the 
domestic market. Some of the State handling author-
ities have been or are being privatised, usually in  the 
hands  of cooperatives  or private  companies  where 
producers have a considerable share of ownership. 
A fundamental characteristic of the system of agri-
cultural production  in  Australia is  that ownership of 
individual  farms  is  based  on  freehold  (and  readily 
negotiable)  title.  This  means  that  aggregation  of 
holdings  can  occur  in  response  to  economic  and 
technical developments in agriculture, as painful as the 
process  can  be  in  such  an  unstable  production  and 
marketing  environment.  Furthermore,  rural-urban 
migration  in  Australia  does  not  present  the  same 
problems  in  China  because  the  number of farmers 
leaving the land at any time is small in relation to the 
urban population. 
Drawing on Australian experience over the last 50 
years, this essay concentrates on the principles of agri-
cultural marketing as  they  affect trade in grain,  with 
special reference to the implications for the reform of 
the  Chinese grain  marketing system.  Although there 
are vast  differences  between  the  grain economies of 
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China and Australia, notably with respect to the impor-
tance of direct consumption of grain by farm  house-
holds  in  China  and  the  role  of external  trade  for 
Australia,  there  are  some  common  questions  with 
respect to marketing policy. 
In particular, decisions have to be taken about how 
existing  public  marketing  agencies  will  be managed. 
Australian  experience  suggests  that  even  limited 
reform  of  grain  marketing  is  difficult  to  achieve 
through negotiation because farmers and their organi-
sations maintain a strong commitment to the status quo, 
even when  the  reasons for the  introduction of earlier 
policies and creation of associated public agencies have 
disappeared (Cashin 1986; Martin 1990). 
Policy  makers  in  China  and  Australia  are  also 
concerned  with  the  absolute  levels  and  stability  of 
domestic and international prices and how grain prices 
are  affected  by  the  trade  policies of other countries. 
Consequently, it is convenient and sensible to consider 
factors affecting grain prices in  Australia and  China, 
alongside issues concerning marketing and marketing 
policy. 
It is interesting to note that development of the mul-
tinational firm as a form of business organisation is, in 
part, an adaptation to the chronic difficulties of trade 
between nation states. Multinational firms perform an 
important function  in  world trade  in  grains (Morgan 
1979).  Their  size  and  influence  is  related  to  their 
ability  to transcend national political  boundaries and 
the profound influence of economies of size in  gener-
ation and processing of technical and economic infor-
mation, which is at the core of commercial success in 
the complex and volatile grain trade (Caves 1977-78). 
Understanding Agricultural Prices and 
Markets 
It is helpful to distinguish between the sub-disciplines 
of price analysis and marketing analysis, both of which 
can  be  applied  to  studying  the  economic  behaviour 
associated with agricultural commodities. 
•  Price  analysis  concerns  the  determination  of 
absolute price levels,  sometimes referred to  as  the 
'flat'  price,  according  to  underlying  supply  and 
demand conditions for the commodity. 
•  Marketing analysis concerns determination of price 
differentials,  around  the  absolute  price  of  the 
commodity, that reflect differences in location, time, 
form and quality. Grain which  is  harvested by farmers,  often at  one 
time  of  the  year,  has  to  be  consumed  by  remote 
consumers  on  every  day  of  the  year.  This 
simple-sounding  process  involves  a  great  deal  of 
economic activity,  which has subtle implications for 
the economic system as a whole. 
Within a competitive market, prices will be uniform 
after the costs of adding (or subtracting) place,  time 
and  form  utility  are  taken  into  account.  Hence,  for 
example, the price of the same grade of the commodity 
would  be  the  same at all  locations at  the same time, 
apart from  transport costs. This is, of course, a mani-
festation  of  the  possibility  of  bargaining  between 
buyers and sellers, or arbitrage. It is also an application 
of the 'law of one price', a powerful way of thinking 
about  the  process  and  effects of competition  in  an 
exchange economy. 
Stated  slightly  differently,  marketing  analysis  is 
concerned with the cost and demand conditions facing 
firms  providing  marketing  services  necessary  to 
supply the commodity to consumers, who have diverse 
requirements and economic characteristics. Marketing 
is  not  just an activity  taking  place  beyond  the  farm 
gate.  Marketing  is  an  important  part  of  farmer 
decision-making. 
As  an analytical  convenience, the  'price' of grain 
can be regarded as  having several dimensions. Prices 
observed in economic transactions are a composite of 
absolute prices and the differentials or margins arising 
in  markets  for  marketing  services. It is  important  to 
recognise that prices of particular marketing services 
may be determined competitively, even though there is 
intervention  by  government  in  determination  of the 
absolute  price,  or  monopolistic  features  in  the 
provision and  pricing of other marketing services by 
private firms. 
Nor  should  distributional  aspects  of  grain  pro-
duction and marketing be ignored if price analysis and 
marketing  analysis  are  to  be  useful.  Producers' 
incomes depend on the price of grain, whether com-
mercial  or  subsistence  farming  is  practised.  Grain 
prices are a determinant of the living standards of the 
rural and urban population, in countries where grain is 
an important part of the diet. This is why the political 
economy of determination of grain prices and institu-
tional  arrangements  for  marketing  grain  assume 
crucial significance in many countries. 
Obviously,  separating  factors  affecting  absolute 
prices and marketing margins will be difficult because 
the  way  prices  are  determined  interacts  with  per-
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formance  of marketing  functions.  This  is  especially 
true  in  rich  countries  because  farmers  and  govern-
ments  often  justify  price-raising  interventions, 
designed to  increase  incomes, behind a smokescreen 
of complaints about the efficiency and equity of mar-
keting.  While  such  complaints  should  be  taken 
seriously and regarded as empirical questions worthy 
of  detailed  investigation,  there  are  straightforward 
explanations for  the  variability  of agricultural  prices 
and their long-term decline without needing to invoke 
problems  specifically  connected  with  marketing. 
(These explanations are elaborated at various points of 
the paper.) 
A similar confusion in  popular discussion of price 
and marketing policy in rich countries is  the frequent 
description  of government  intervention  as  'stabili-
sation', when the intent is not to stabilise prices about 
their average  level,  but  to  raise  average  prices  and 
incomes permanently. This confusion has  bedevilled 
discussion  of agricultural  policy  in  Australia  over 
many  years.  Wheat  marketing  arrangements  were 
something of an exception in that there was a genuine 
element of stabilisation in the intent, if not the effect, 
of Australian policies. 
Assistance and Regulation 
Stripped  to  their  bare  essentials,  the  important 
questions about the grains industries concem the role 
of government.  Intervention  by  government  can  be 
more readily understood by distinguishing between the 
assistance  and  regulatory  effects  of  intervention. 
Assistance refers to the direct effects of government 
policy on prices received and paid and the incomes of 
producers and consumers. Regulatory effects refer to 
the  way  government  policy  affects  development  of 
marketing  institutions  and performance of marketing 
functions.  As a general rule, the  way  political forces 
influence  provision  of  assistance  by  governments 
means assistance regimes reinforce established indus-
tries,  compared  with  newer industries and  economic 
opportunities. 
Most  often,  regulation  and  assistance  occur 
together but there are exceptions. United States grain 
policy  has recently provided considerable assistance 
to farmers, without much effect on marketing, which 
is mainly organised on free market lines (McCalla and 
Schmitz  \979;  Roberts et al.  1989).  The  European 
Union (E.C.) also  provides substantial assistance to grain  growers  and  other  farmers  within  a 
market-based production and distribution system. The 
effects of assistance to the domestic grains industries 
of the V.S. and the B.U. have spilt over to the world 
market and are an  important source of instability  in 
world prices (1ohnson 1991). 
In  contrast, Australian policy has provided little 
direct  assistance  to  grain  growers,  and  at  times 
negative assistance, but has involved extensive regu-
lation  by  government over many  years,  with  sub-
stantial  effects  on  the  evolution  of the  marketing 
system  (Longworth  and  Knopke  1982;  Hussey 
1986).  The  situation  in  Canada  is  closer  to 
normal--considerable  assistance  is  provided  to 
Canadian  producers,  with  an  extremely  regulated 
marketing system. 
Government intervention in the agricultural sectors 
of  market economies is intended to correct deficiencies 
occurring through operation of market forces if firms 
are  left  to their  own  devices;  or,  intended  to  redis-
tribute  income  and  wealth  amongst  producers,  or 
between  producers and the  rest  of society.  Usually, 
both reasons coexist. Although politicians and policy-
makers often talk as if there are few ways they can act, 
it is worthwhile to separate in principle the objectives 
of  economic policy, which are limited because they are 
politically  determined,  from  instruments  of  policy 
where  on  closer inspection and  analysis greater dis-
cretion will exist. 
The Role of  Economic Information 
Economic systems differ in the way political problems 
and economic opportunities associated with growth of 
the agricultural sector and increasing specialisation in 
the  economy  are  expressed  and  reconciled.  This  is 
especially true with respect to the way economic infor-
mation is generated and translated into decisions about 
production  and  consumption  and,  most  importantly, 
how  the  uncertainty  of production  and  marketing is 
managed. 
Controversy over the role of information is central 
to debates concerning economic planning and the con-
ception, scope and implementation of plans. Consider-
ation  of a  large  part  of the  economy  such  as  grain 
production  and  marketing  illuminates  broader  theo-
retical, historical and empirical features of economic 
and  political  organisation  extending  beyond 
immediate  concern  with  grain  production,  con-
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sumption  and  marketing.  This  is  especially  so  for 
China,  where  grain  production  is  an  important 
component of  economic activity. 
Transition  from  rigid  central  planning  to  a  more 
market-based  approach  to  economic  organisation  in 
China has  placed considerable demands on  arrange-
ments for the generation and transmission of  economic 
information  necessary  for  grain  producers  and 
consumers to make decentralised decisions about pro-
duction and consumption. 
Another pervasive characteristic shared by  grains 
is  that  they  are  produced  seasonally,  with  output 
variable  from  year-to-year  for  elimatic  and  other 
reasons. However, grains are consumed continuously 
by  geographically-dispersed consumers at a more or 
less constant rate. Consequently, production has to be 
financed from season to season either from savings of 
producers,  or through  credit  provided  by  financial 
institutions. Storage also has  to be financed, within 
and  between  years,  for  consumption  to  be  main-
tained. 
It  follows  that  understanding  grain  marketing  is 
connected with  analysis of development of financial 
arrangements  for  farmers  and  marketing  institutions 
enabling storage, transport and processing of grain and 
its products (McKinnon  1973). Sometimes, credit and 
financing  services  to  farmers  will  be  provided  by 
marketing  agencies  in  aSSOCIation  with  other 
marketing  functions,  but  as  the  economy  develops, 
more  production  and  marketing  activities  will  be 
financed  separately  by  banks  and  other  specialised 
financial intermediaries. 
The  development  of agricultural  marketing  is  an 
important  aspect of economic development (Watson 
\983). The strategy pursued in establishing marketing 
institutions  in  developing  economies  has  conse-
quences for the economy as a whole. As observed in 
China,  the  rapid  growth  of township-village  enter-
prises in  recent years has been influenced by changes 
in  agricultural  production  and  increasing  use  of 
marketing  services.  Examples  include  growth  of 
transport  and  marketing  facilities  to  supply  urban 
centres  with  food,  and  farmers  with  fertilizers  and 
other  inputs,  and  the  development  of early  stage 
processing of food in rural areas. 
Markets may be thought of as  the means by  which 
exchange  takes  place  between  buyers  and  sellers. 
Exchange requires coordination of buyers and sellers 
and  performance  of essential  marketing  functions. 
This coordination can take place in a variety of ways. Changes in the way markets are organised have come 
from  improvements  in  market  technology  and 
increasing specialisation in the performance of market 
functions (Phi1lips  \966). 
The first major step in the development of markets 
was  the  invention of money  which  reduced costs of 
communication. The next important step was the intro-
duction  of specialist  middlemen  into  cash  markets. 
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Then  followed  arrangements  so  that production  and 
consumption could be coordinated in  time as  well as 
space. Forward and futures markets represented a sig-
nificant  innovation  in  coping  with  uncertainty  and 
enabled further specialisation by  market participants. 
The persistence of different methods of marketing in 
many  situations  suggests  that  no  single  method  is 
inherently better than others. Approaches to Agricultural Marketing 
Introductory Comments 
There are several  ways of thinking about and studying 
agricultural marketing. A simple but useful starting defi-
nition  is  that  agricultural  marketing  concerns  the 
economic  processes  occuning  as  goods  move  from 
producers  to  consumers  and  money  moves  in  the 
opposite direction. The emphasis in this paper is on the 
nature and performance of  marketing functions and deter-
mination of the prices of marketing services (marketing 
margins).  Considerable attention  is  given to the  role of 
the marketing system and marketing institutions in coor-
dinating  economic  decisions  by  producers,  consumers 
and other participants in the marketing system. 
Grain crops have economic and other characteristics 
which require development of sophisticated marketing 
systems in the process of economic growth. As is well 
known.  the  relative  importance of agriculture  in  the 
economy  declines  with  economic  growth.  A  major 
reason for this decline is that services and non-agricul-
tural goods have a higher income elasticity of demand, 
compared with food products (Anderson 1987). 
Moreover, the competitive structure of agriculture in 
market economies lends itself to rapid introduction of 
techniques of production substituting capital for labour 
and  ensuring  rapid  rate  of growth  in  productivity 
within  agriculture.  Recent  analysis  of the  declining 
share of agriculture in  the course of economic growth 
has emphasised the effects of changing relative factor 
supplies (Martin and Warr 1993). As elaborated by the 
well known Rybczynski theorem in  international trade 
theory.  as  capital  accumulation  proceeds  throughout 
the economy, the output of eapital-intensive industries 
increases  but  the  output  of  more  labour-intensive 
industries declines. 
This  has  long-run  implications  for  the  size  and 
structure of the agricultural sector, and its relationship 
to  the  rest  of the  economy.  As  greater division  of 
labour  occurs  in  the  economy,  the  increasing 
non-farming population requires access to food, with a 
consequent need for storage, transport, processing and 
other  marketing  services  provided  by  agribusiness 
firms. At the same time, farming becomes more capital 
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and input-intensive  with  an  increasing  need for spe-
cialised firms to produce and supply inputs to farmers. 
The growth of commercial and merchandiSing activity 
in the early stages of  economic development will often 
be  undertaken  by  the same firms,  whether these  are 
private or public entities. In China, merchanting activ-
ities have traditionally been carried out by local supply 
and marketing co-operatives. 
Kohls and Uhl  (1980) have suggested three ways of 
studying agricultural and food markets: 
•  the functional approach; 
•  the institutional approach; 
•  the behavioural systems approach. 
All  of these approaches are used to some extent in 
this paper. 
Biases Against Marketing and 
Middlemen 
An  important  advantage  of  adopting  a  functional 
approach to  agricultural marketing is  that it  immedi-
ately disposes of the most common fallacy about mar-
keting;  which  is  that  marketing  services  are  less 
necessary,  or even  less  worthy,  than  activities  like 
farming  and  manufacturing  which  produce  tangible 
outputs. This fallacy is a major barrier to proper under-
standing of agricultural marketing and is a substantial 
impediment to fomluI ation of  marketing policy. 
The existence of widespread and profound distrust 
of marketing  across  a  wide  range  of cultures  and 
different economic systems suggests that there may be 
a  common  cause.  A  more  subtle  explanation  is 
required than merely drawing attention to the normal 
feelings of disdain expressed by 'producers' about the 
activities of 'middlemen'. (Middlemen are individuals, 
firms  or  public  agencies  that  perform  functions 
necessary for goods to  move from  producers to con-
sumers, and associated financing activities.) 
A  more  persuasive  explanation  of  the  almost 
universal  suspicion  of marketing  and  middlemen  is 
that  parts  of  the  marketing  system  have  features 
leading  to  monopolistic  behaviour  by  firms,  with potential  exploitation of fanners  and/or consumers. 
This  concern  applies  to  both  market  and  cen-
trally-planned  economies.  Consequently,  distribu-
tional  issues  are  central  to  evaluation  of  the 
perfonnance of agricultural markets. 
A major difficulty in assessing the degree of  compe-
tition  in  the  provision  of  agricultural  marketing 
services  is  the  possibility that  economic  infonnation 
may not be available on  reasonable tern1S  to  various 
parties  in  many  marketing  transactions.  Developing 
arrangements for the provision of market infonnation 
is  critical  in  the  establishment of marketing  institu-
tions,  especially  in  the  transition  from  a  cen-
trally-planned to a market economy (Intriligator 1993). 
The perfonnance of the marketing system should be 
treated as an empirical question requiring analysis and 
evidence. It is  not sufficient to  assume monopoly or 
competition is the case in particular situations; circum-
stances prevailing in agricultural  markets have to be 
investigated. In market economies, the most important 
question  to consider is  the ease of entry and exit of 
finns supplying marketing services. 
Too often, debates over agricultural  marketing, as 
with other aspects of trade and industry policy, have 
been muddied by the failure to recognise that there is a 
logical  and  methodological  difference  between  the 
economic  theory  and  empirical  evidence  that  is 
relevant in  analysis and research at the firm level and 
the  industry level. In  particular, there has been much 
confusion about the  meaning of 'competitiveness' at 
the firn1,  industry and national levels (Krugman 1994). 
In essence, all marketing systems perform the same 
physical  and  economic  functions  of  exchange, 
physical and  temporal  transfonnation. financing  and 
infonnation generation whether markcting systems are 
regulated or unregulated. or exist in  market-based or 
centrally-planned  economies.  While  it  should  be 
obvious  that  these  functions  are  as  necessary  and 
essential to the operation of the economy as any other 
activities,  popular  suspicion  of marketing  and  the 
various  intennediaries  (middlemen)  who  provide 
marketing  services docs have some connection with 
controversies in the development of economic theory, 
in  particular  the  distinction  drawn  by  the  classical 
economists  between  'productive'  and  'non-pro-
ductive' labour. 
In  that  discussion,  however,  'productive'  did  not 
mean 'useful'. The classical economists had no doubt 
about  the  usefulness  of merchandising  and  related 
activities required to bring buyers and sellers together 
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as  the  economy  becomes  more  specialised  (Blaug 
1970,  p.  282).  Productive  labour  in  these  theories 
meant labour that produced a surplus over and above 
the wages paid to it, and thereby contributed to capital 
accumulation. The distinction did not concern labour 
in particular occupations. 
At  issue in those earlier debates was the difference 
between economic activity  resulting  in  capital accu-
mulation  and  activity  servicing  immediate  needs  of 
households.  The  concepts of productive  and  unpro-
ductive labour used by the classical economists were 
closer to  modem  concepts of gross  investment  and 
consumption  than  ideas  about  the  necessity  or use-
fulness of marketing. 
Nevertheless, it  seems that this confusion explains 
the low priority given to the development of marketing 
in  centrally-planned  economies  in  most  of  the 
twentieth century. It is most unfortunate that distrust of 
markets  and  marketing  was  such  that  mundane  and 
uncontroversial marketing activities like village fairs 
and local markets were curtailed from time to time. 
Marketing Functions 
The major marketing functions have been categorised 
by Kohls and Uhl (1980, p. 24) as follows: 
A.  Exchange functions. 
I.  Buying (assembling). 
2.  Selling. 
B.  Physical functions. 
3.  Storage. 
4.  Transportation. 
5.  Processing. 
C.  Facilitating functions. 
6.  Standardisation. 
7.  Financing. 
8.  Risk-bearing. 
9.  Market intelligence. 
While the nature of individual functions  is  largely 
self-explanatory,  more  difficult  issues  arise  con-
cerning  how  functions  are  organised  within,  and 
between, firms and in deciding what is the meaning of 
concepts like productivity and economic efficiency in 
the context of marketing. 
•  Exchange  functions  involve  the  transfer  of 
ownership,  a  process  implying  the  existence  of 
processes for price discovery and determination of 
other tenns of sale. The perfonnance of exchange 
functions also requires a system of property rights for  agreements  between  buyers  and  sellers  to  be 
enforced and disputes settled. 
•  Physical  functions  are  activities involving  handling, 
transport and transformation of the product-that is, 
problems of 'when', 'what', and 'where' in marketing. 
These  are  productive  activities  in  their  own  right, 
certainly  from  the perspective of people performing 
the functions. Processing of agricultural products will 
usually  be  thought of as a production activity per se 
and not regarded as a marketing function. This is true 
for  products like meat, milk  and  sugar where  initial 
processing is  essential  before  products are  useful  to 
consumers. 
•  Facilitating  functions  are  aetivities  that  allow 
exchange  and  physical  functions  to  take  place 
smoothly.  Facilitating  functions  include  functions 
concerned with generation, transmission and use of 
economic  information-about  the  product  itself, 
and about prevailing economic conditions affecting 
marketing decisions. 
Some  economists  regard  issues  concerning  infor-
mation  as  central  to  the  whole  idea  of  marketing 
(Phillips  1968).  The  role  of  information  in  the 
discovery  and behaviour of agricultural  prices can be 
illustrated by introducing the idea that economic affairs 
concern the known, the unknown and the unknowable. 
Prices observed in markets reflect known information 
about past prices and quantities and precise knowledge 
of forthcoming supply and demand. Other information 
is  unknown,  but sufficiently important to participants 
operating in  the  market that it could be  discovered  if 
enough effort were invested in finding out. Other infor-
mation  is  unknowable-it cannot  be  known  until  it 
occurs. Obvious examples from agriculture are climatic 
conditions and political decisions about market access. 
These issues are elaborated below in the context of the 
role  of  futures  markets  as  instruments  for  price 
discovery and risk management. 
Kohls and Uhl  (1980) suggest that there are three 
characteristics  of marketing  that  can  be  recognised 
from applying a functional approach to marketing. 
•  First, marketing not only adds costs, it  adds value. 
Evaluation of marketing functions, or the marketing 
system in aggregate, has to involve consideration of 
benefits and costs. Efficiency of marketing cannot be 
judged by simple comparisons of costs; in particular, 
by resorting to the common and misleading criterion 
of  the  farmer's  share  of  the  consumer's  dollar. 
Obviously, this ratio can be  high, as  with roadside 
sales by subsistence producers, or low, as  with sales 
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by producers in countries like Australia to consumers 
in  the  northern  hemisphere,  without  the  ratio 
providing useful information about the efficiency of 
marketing or the prosperity of farn1ers. 
•  The  second  important  advantage  of  applying  a 
functional  approach  to  marketing  pointed  out  by 
Kohls  and  Uhl  (1980)  is  that  though  there  are 
different ways marketing functions can be organised 
by  individuals, co-operatives, government agencies 
or private firms, it is difficult to eliminate marketing 
functions  altogether.  Farmers  or  consumers  may 
seek to eliminate middlemen,  but only at  the cost 
and  inconvenience  of  performing  the  functions 
themselves. 
•  Third, marketing  functions  may  be indispensable, 
but the functions  have different economic features 
which,  together with  the  economic  characteristics 
of agricultural  products,  influence  the  extent  to 
which marketing functions can be combined within 
the  one  organisation.  The  skills  required  to 
undertake  marketing  activities  are  vastly  different 
between  the  individual  functions,  and, especially, 
from those required in agricultural production. 
The characteristics of marketing functions differ in 
important respects. Economic and technical  relation-
ships between size and cost differ between marketing 
functions.  This  means  the  scale  of  operations  is 
different for firms specialising in particular marketing 
functions. Public or private firms providing storage are 
generally  large.  Management of storage  is  complex 
and risky,  technically and economically. In  addition, 
storage  firms  are  large  because  the  capital  cost  of 
storage  increases  less  than  proportionally  with 
increasing storage capacity. Storage is associated with 
a degree of natural monopoly which  is  not consistent 
with competitive markets. 
In contrast, the optimal scale of operations of firms 
performing  marketing  functions  needing  special 
attention to requirements of customers is less subject 
to economies of size. Businesses providing important 
marketing services like provision of  some types of spe-
cialised market information are often small. 
The way differences between product characteristics 
and economic features of markets affect the economics 
of agricultural pricing and marketing can be illustrated 
by  considering the  situation of Australia's broadacre 
industries (grains,  meat  and  wool).  Thus,  grains  and 
meat are affected on  the demand side by  problems of 
market access, whereas an industrial material like wool 
is vulnerable to fluctuations in the trade cycle. A ~ote  on Value Adding with Special Reference to Australia 
Comparisons of marketing  costs  hetween commodities. 
between countries and hetween time periods are an unsat-
isfactory way of  evaluating the efficiency of marketing. In 
a not dissimilar way, it is fallacious to regard value adding 
through  further  processing  of agricultural  products  or 
investment in  other marketing activities as  economically 
beneficial per se (Watson 1993). In essence, this fallacy is 
another version of  the rejection of the principle of  compar-
ative  advantage and denial  of gains from  specialisation, 
which is at the heart of popular distmst of marketing. 
It is important  to  note  that these observations about 
value adding for an exporting country like Australia do 
not  apply  to  a  developing  country  like  China  where 
increasing agricultural production is taking place close to 
expanding  markets  in  urban  centres  and  large  cities. 
Investment  in  further  processing  and  provision  of 
transport infrastructure will have an important economic 
role in these circumstances. 
However, confusion over the concept of value adding 
has had pervasive and generally negative effects on other 
aspects  of  agricultural  policy  in  Australia.  Further 
comment is justified in this paper. 
The  1992  Amendments  to  the  Wheat  Marketing  Act 
/989 included as an objective for the A  WB 'to participate in 
value  added activities and the  power to do so.  These are 
deemed to be activities which increase the value of  grain or 
grain products' (Ryan 1994. p. Ill).  The A  WB has recently 
established a joint processing venture with an enterprise in 
southern China through an investment funded by the Wheat 
Industry Fund, financed by levies on wheat growers. 
The investment of the  A  WB  should he judged on its 
merits,  however.  because  it  is  neither  sensible,  nor 
possible, to make a categorical statement for  or against 
particular examples of investment in  further processing 
or value adding. However, Malcolm (1994, p.  154) has 
interpreted  the  current  interest  of the  A  WB  in  value 
Australia has market power in  the wool  industry by 
virtue  of its  substantial  share  of the  world  market, 
whereas Australia is a price taker for most commodities 
on  the world market, except  in  so far as problems of 
market access mean that it  is sometimes profitable for 
Australia to intervene to control the supply of meat and 
grain to some world markets. With respect to the per-
fonnance and organisation of marketing activities, meat 
is  perishable,  whereas  grains  and  wool  are  storable. 
Wool  can be stored more cheaply than grain. On the 
supply side, grains are annual crops and meat and wool 
are continuously produced livestock products. 
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adding  as  'little more  than  a  diversionary  part of the 
critical  process  of transforming  a  statutory  marketing 
authority, the A  WB, into a private grain trader'. 
The interesting and important questions about value 
adding are with respect to public policy. It is  illogical to 
believe all countries should export agricultural products 
in  more  processed forms.  Further  processing  is  not an 
end in itself. Providing marketing services adds cost as 
well as value. The critical question is whether the rate of 
return to investment in processing is greater than the rate 
of return  in  other economic  activities,  including addi-
tional production of commodities. 
Returns  to  marketing  activities  are  returns  to  costs 
incurred and resources invested in  providing additional 
marketing services.  What  needs to  be  assessed  is  how 
economic forces favouring processing or adding value to 
grain close to the point of production interact with factors 
favouring processing close to the point of consumption? 
For firms in processing industries. significant risk occurs 
due  to  the  financial  costs  of  holding  inventories, 
semi-manufactures  and  processed  products.  The  costs 
and  risks  of  inventory  management  increase  as  the 
distance, in time and space. from the point of production 
to the point of  consumption becomes greater. 
Unsophisticated Australian advocates  for  value adding 
consistently underestimate the economic costs of  control in 
producing  processed  products  for  consumers  in  remote 
markets.  Some  Australian  firms  who have  accepted  the 
simple-minded approach of  the enthusiasts for value adding 
are now experiencing considerable difficulties. Put another 
way.  the  comparative advantage enjoyed by  Australia in 
grain production and any comparative advantage that might 
exist in  further  processing of grain  are  entirely different 
matters.  The  other  important  issue  involving  further 
processing concerns the roles of  govemmem and the private 
sector in pursuing opportunities for value adding. 
The  industrial  organisation  of  firms  engaged  in 
marketing needs to be considered vertically and hori-
zontally. The vertical structure describes the way !"inns 
are organised to perform marketing functions,  singly 
or  in  combination,  for  goods  to  move  from  the 
producer to the consumer. 
The  vertical  structure  identifies  the  marketing 
channels that exist to carry out the marketing task. In a 
flexible  and  competitive  marketing  system,  these 
channels  will  be  in  the  process  of  fonning  and 
refonning. As Finns compete in  seeking out different 
ways of peJi'onning marketing functions, the channels can also be considered as  being  in  competition with 
one another. 
Horizontal  competition  describes  competition 
between  firms  performing  similar  marketing  func-
tions.  Because  marketing  is  a  specialised  activity, 
requiring  specialised  capital  equipment  and.  impor-
tantly,  access  to  specialised  information  and 
knowledge, marketing firms often operate in a number 
of  commodity  markets.  The  way  that  marketing 
functions are best organised within and between firms 
is  an  extremely  complex  issue,  the  more  so  for  an 
economy  like  China  which  is  in  the  process  of 
economic liberalisation. 
Issues  concerning  the  industrial  organisation  of 
grain marketing are discussed below in the context of 
the performance of individual marketing functions. 
The Institutional Approach 
Whereas the  functional  approach describes the 'what' 
of marketing,  the  institutional approach describes the 
'who'. Kohls and Uhl (1980, p. 29) classify middlemen 
in marketing as follows: 
A.  Merchant intermediaries. 
I.  Retailers. 
2.  Wholesalers. 
B.  Agent intermediaries. 
\.  Brokers. 
2.  Wholesalers. 
C.  Speculative intermediaries. 
D.  Processors and manufacturers. 
E.  Facilitative organisations. 
Merchant  intermediaries take  title  to  the  products 
they  handle.  The  distinction  between  retailers  and 
wholesalers  is  that  the  former  deal  with  the  final 
consumer, whereas wholesalers sell to retailers, other 
wholesalers and industrial users. Wholesalers are par-
ticularly  important in  agriculture, collecting products 
from  farms  and  transferring  them  to  population 
centres.  Merchant  intermediaries  depend  for  their 
incomes  on  the  margin  between  buying  and  selling 
prices being sufficient, over a series of transactions, to 
cover the costs of the services they provide. 
Agent intermediaries act as representatives of their 
clients without ever owning products, charging fees or 
commissions  for  their  services.  Unlike  merchants, 
agents do not bear the risks arising from price changes 
occurring during the time they are handling goods. 
Speculative  intermediaries  are  merchants  whose 
primary objective is to profit from price changes while 
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holding stocks of the commodity. In effect, their role is 
to  specialise  in  the  function  of risk-bearing.  In  the 
process  of buying  goods  when  they  are  cheap  and 
selling when they are dear, speculative intermediaries 
stabilise prices. Successful private speculation should 
therefore  be  regarded  as  making  a  useful  economic 
contribution.  These  speculative  activities  are  often 
carried out by firms providing storage facilities. 
Stabilising speculation is the underlying objective of 
national and international buffer stock schemes, intro-
duced with the  intention of stabilising prices of agri-
cultural  and  mineral  commodities.  The  success  of 
buffer stock schemes depends upon setting prices that 
balance supply and demand in  the  long-run. If prices 
are set too high, stocks will accumulate and financial 
reserves will be exhausted. (Correspondingly, if prices 
are set very conservatively, the stabilising effect will 
be minimal.) Operating a buffer stock scheme requires 
skill in  forecasting or,  at  the least, knowledge of the 
probability  distribution  of prices  so that  mechanical 
buying and selling rules can be  implemented. (Buffer 
stock schemes are discussed further below.) 
Frequent  opportunities  for  successful  speculation 
may  indicate deficiencies  in  the  provision of market 
information to  market participants. Moreover. specu-
lation  may  be  destabilising  if  trading  in  stocks  is 
adjusted  in  the  same direction as prices change. This 
would happen if large numbers of speculators based 
expectations  of future  prices  on  current  prices  and 
acted to protect their investment in stocks by assuming 
a continuation of the trend in  prices;  reducing stocks 
on a falling market and vice versa. 
Reconciling  different views  on  the  role  of specu-
lation  and the activities  of speculators is  one  of the 
most controversial issues in the whole field of agricul-
tural marketing. 
The immediate role of  processors and manufacturers 
in  transforming  agricultural  products  is  self-evident. 
The interesting issue is the extent to which processors 
and  manufacturers  involve  themselves  in  other 
marketing  functions.  Processors  may  sometimes  act 
like  merchants  and  purchase  commodities  directly 
from  farmers.  Occasionally, processors  may  contract 
with farmers to produce commodities to the specifica-
tions they require. Processors may also act as whole-
salers  and  distribute  manufactured  products  to 
retailers.  In  other  cases,  processors  may  assume 
functions usually associated with retailers by engaging 
in consumer advertising and other forms of promotion 
to encourage sales of  their own output. Facilitative organisations do not usually participate 
directly in marketing. Their role is to assist marketing 
firms  undertake  their  functions.  Examples  of facili-
tative  organisations  include  futures  exchanges,  the 
bodies which establish and enforce rules under which 
trading  in  futures  contracts  takes  place;  central 
wholesale and retail markets, management of which is 
often  the  function  of  local  government;  and,  trade 
associations that provide services such as market infor-
mation to their members. 
The existence of all  intermediaries is an expression 
of advantages that accrue to specialisation and division 
of labour. The role of middlemen has to be considered 
from  both supply and demand sides. Some marketing 
functions  are  characterised  by  economies  of  size. 
Other  functions  are  labour-intensive.  Cost  savings 
occurring  through  use  of specialised  intermediaries 
have to be compared with costs that would be incurred 
by  producers  and  consumers  if  they  performed 
marketing functions on their own account. Most often, 
the cost is an opportunity cost. since time diverted to 
marketing is at the expense of other activities, in  pro-
duction and consumption. 
There  are  economic  limits  to  the  extent  to  which 
division of labour occurs  in  agricultural  marketing at 
various stages of economic development. From the per-
spective  of  the  supply  and  demand  for  marketing 
services,  increasing  costs  of  labour  associated  with 
economic growth are both a spur and an impediment to 
increasing  specialisation  in  marketing.  Economic 
growth  is  accompanied  by  highcr  wages,  which 
encourages the substitution of capital for labour in mar-
keting. Usually, this enhances the role of intermediaries. 
While  the  demand  for  most  marketing  services  is 
income  elastic,  increasing  labour  costs  slow  down 
growth  of marketing  functions  which  are  inherently 
labour-intensive.  Thc  growth  of  supermarkets  in 
wealthy countries where, in  effect, consumers take on 
marketing functions that were previously performed by 
retailers on their behalf, is an interesting case in point. In 
this case, the  saving of time. which has  an  increasing 
opportunity cost for consumers, more than  offsets the 
higher labour costs embedded in marketing services. 
The complexity of marketing means that it  is  inher-
ently  difficult  to  prescribe  in  advance  the  most 
desirable marketing system. Agricultural products and 
markets are  neither homogeneous nor stable. This  is 
why agricultural marketing lends itself to coordination 
by the price mechanism. 
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The Behavioural Systems Approach 
Kohls and Uhl  () 980, pp.  34-36) identify four major 
types  of problems,  and  their  associated  behavioural 
systems,  which can  be  used  to  further categorise the 
agricultural  marketing  system.  The  behavioural 
systems approach can be applicd to either a marketing 
firm or a collection of firms in a marketing channel. In 
terms of  this approach, marketing can be considered as: 
•  an input-output system; 
•  a power system; 
•  a communications system; 
•  a  system  for  adapting  to  internal  and  external 
change. 
The analysis of marketing as a behavioural system 
is  useful  in  emphasising  that  other  branches  of 
knowledge  are  important  in  studying  marketing, 
rather than  only  the  discipline of economics.  Thus, 
focusing  on  input-output  relationships  draws 
attention to the role of operations research and engi-
neering  principles  in  analysing  marketing.  For 
example,  knowledge  of statistics  and  the  theory  of 
probability is essential to understanding the economic 
role of storage,  deciding  how  much  to  store  and  in 
designing storage systems. 
The idea of marketing as a power system in which 
agents seck to control events introduces the need to 
apply political science and social psychology to mar-
keting. Conventional economics does not have much 
useful to say about what leads to  spurts of enterprise 
and  innovation  in  marketing  or  what  causes 
consumers  to  behave  in  an  individualistic  or group 
fashion. 
In  a similar way,  the  disciplines of sociology and 
business management explain communication within 
and between firms.  Understanding communication is 
important to marketing. The ability  to process infor-
mation is a major determinant of the size of firms and 
marketing agencies. 
Finally, marketing firms and enterprises exist in an 
environment where the ability to adapt to changes in 
economic  conditions  and  technology  is  paramount. 
This  is  another  dimension  in  which  agricultural 
marketing must be studied. For example. introduction 
of objective  grading  systems.  which  have  pervasive 
economic effecls on marketing by allowing commod-
ities  to  be  sold  and purchased sight unseen, depends 
upon  the existence of defensible scientific criteria to 
measure the characteristics of agricultural products. Grain Marketing in Australia 
Economic Aspects of  the Grains 
Industries 
Australia  has  an  intrinsic  comparative  advantage  in 
grain production by  virtue of abundant land and satis-
factory,  if  difficult,  climatic  conditions  for  grain 
growing. These endowments have  been  supported by 
investment in  scientific research and development of 
the  social  and  physical  infrastructure  necessary  to 
sustain  grain  production  and  marketing.  However, 
these  natural  advantages  and  associated  private  and 
public  investment have not  always ensured the  pros-
perity of the Australian grains industries. 
Vigorous debates over price and marketing policy 
for grains were once an important feature of national 
political  life.  Even  though  the  conceptual  issues 
remain the same, the significance of these arguments 
has  declined  because  the  grains  industries  have 
declined  in  relative  importance. The  political  power 
once hcld by grain growers is now greatly diminished 
with  continuing  urbanisation  of  the  Australian 
economy. Most of the heat has gone out of the debate 
over grain marketing. Many of the reasons for earlier 
controversies have faded  into distant memory. In  any 
case, marketing policy  has  been subject to slow but 
continuous change. 
As is true with any interesting question of  economic 
and agricultural policy, the critical issue concerns the 
role  of  government  in  determining  the  balance 
between  private  and  public  activity  in  grain  mar-
keting. The effects of government on grain marketing 
in  Australia have been so pervasive that farmers had 
little scope for autonomous action in  marketing, until 
recently. This explains the emphasis given to the Aus-
tralian Wheat Board (A WB) in this paper. 
It could be argued that the approach to marketing in 
Australia was based on a misdiagnosis of  the problems 
of the grain industries. Previous pol icies were based on 
implicit and explicit assumptions about the adequacy 
of  marketing  arrangements.  In  particular,  the 
assumption  that  actions  of private  marketing  agents 
were detrimental to producers. This should have been 
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regarded as  an  empirical question, deserving inquiry 
and  evidence.  The  same  answer could  not  be  given 
today as  in the past, when the foundations of existing 
policies were laid. 
The structure of the Australian grains industries and 
their domestic  competitiveness  were,  and  are,  more 
important than marketing policies for the prosperity of 
grain growers. Low income problems arise within the 
grains industries because the distribution of farm size 
is  skewed. There will  always be marginal famls.  All 
farms are vulnerable to low prices or low yields caused 
by adverse weather. The fanners who run  into diffi-
culty  will  be  those  whose  borrowing  decisions, 
intended to enable expansion of their farms, have left 
them financially exposed. The competitiveness of the 
grains industries has been affected by developments in 
the  eeonomy as  a  whole.  The  growth  of mining  in 
Australia has had substantial effects on other tradeable 
goods industries in the past 30 years, through its effect 
on the exchange rate (Gregory 1976). 
Although  political  commitment  to  intervention  is 
now on the wane, the history of marketing and pricing 
arrangements for grain over the past 50 years has been 
dominated by intervention by government in determi-
nation  of  prices  and  government  regulation  of 
marketing functions. This intervention was not always 
the case. Initially, the marketing system had developed 
along traditional lines with grain merchants and other 
intermediaries performing their classical role of coor-
dinating  trade  between  producers  and  consumers 
(Beasley 1928; Dunsdorfs 1956). 
As  in  other  countries  of  recent  European  set-
tlement, development of wheat and other grain indus-
tries in Australia depended on adapting techniques of 
produetion originally developed in the northern hem-
isphere, to  local  agronomic conditions.  In  addition, 
when  markets  in  the  northern  hemisphere  grew 
rapidly in the nineteenth century, the development of 
export grain industries depended on investment and 
innovation  in  transport  facilities.  A  powerful 
influence on the development of the Australian grain 
industry  was  falling  freight  rates  for  land  and  sea transport,  following  growth  of  the  local  railway 
system and introduction of steamships. This enabled 
new and remote grain-producing regions in countries 
like Australia to be linked to the old world. For bulk 
commodities  like  grain,  production  and  trade  are 
influenced by transport costs as well as costs of pro-
duction. 
Frequently, transport costs will  be  more  important 
than  production  costs  in  determining  the  pattern  of 
regional  production  and  domestic  and  international 
trade.  Consequently,  the  efficiency  of the  transport 
system is  a crucial deternlinant of the profitability of 
grain production and the cost of grain to consumers in 
all  countries.  In  particular, gross differences between 
the cost of land  and water transport have a pervasive 
effect on the regional pattern of production. 
Once the Australian grain industry was linked to the 
world market, Australian producers were vulnerable to 
international developments, with all that this  implied 
for the level and stability of their incomes. The origin 
of most intervention  in  the Australian grain  industry 
was  the  economic  situation  in  the  I  930s,  when 
depressed conditions on the world market, problems of 
market  access,  and  the  disastrous  consequences  of 
ill-judged decisions by earlier Federal and State gov-
ernments with respect to land settlement, combined to 
create an  acute  low  income problem  in  much of the 
grain industry (Lake 1987). 
The  world  wheat  market then  had  features  which 
many Australian producers did not find to their liking. 
(And it essentially still does.) The demand for wheat 
for human consumption is  inelastic. This means that 
fluctuations  in  output lead  to  wide swings  in  prices, 
although  these  fluctuations  may  be  moderated  by 
private and public storage. 
Until the mid-1980s, the stockholding policies of the 
United States placed a virtual floor under world prices 
(Miller and White 1980). The situation changed drasti-
cally when the U.S. embarked on an aggressive strategy 
of attempting  to  recover  its  'market share'  from  the 
European  Union  through  the  Export  Enhancement 
Plan, an  ostensibly targeted and  selective program of 
export subsidies, designed to force the E.U. to the nego-
tiating table (Roberts et al.  1989). 
These  stated  intentions  have  not  stopped  U.S. 
policies having a most disruptive effect on world trade 
to the benefit of some importing countries, and to 
the considerable cost of  exporters like Australia. More 
realistically, the trade policies of the U.S. can be inter-
preted  as  having  the  additional  effect  of enabling 
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higher  domestic  (U.S.)  prices,  thereby  providing 
assistance  to  U.S.  producers.  The  oft-proclaimed 
objective of regaining 'market share' in  those export 
markets  supposedly  'lost'  unfairly  to  the  E.U., 
provides  the  mixture  of  nationalist  sentiment  and 
incantation necessary to disguise the fact that current 
U.S.  policies  represent  a substantial  retreat from  the 
liberal trade policies advocated by the U.S. in the past. 
Current U.S. policies have significantly increased the 
level of assistance to U.S. farmers, however they may 
be justified in the rhetoric of  trade diplomacy. 
Australia's share of  world wheat trade is insufficient 
to affect prices, except  under special circumstances. 
Australia  has  very  limited  influence  on  the  trade 
policies  of  importing  countries  or  competing 
exporters. It is only on the domestic market that there 
is  a  prospect of raising  prices  and  revenue  through 
cooperation  between  producers,  under  the  aegis  of 
government. 
The  diversified  output  and  complex  economic 
organisation of the Australian grain industry has impli-
cations  for  the  management  of  production  and 
marketing risks. Farm incomes will be partly stabilised 
on multiple-output farms  because prices of commod-
ities are not perfectly correlated. Farmers can manage 
risk  by controlling expenditure on inputs and capital 
investment. Furthermore, under Australian conditions, 
fluctuations  in  grain  yields  have  more  significant 
effects on farmers' incomes than price fluctuations. It 
follows from these observations that the financial risks 
to which producers are exposed are partly a matter of 
individual choice, since there are different ways pro-
duction can be organised. Farmers also make choices 
about  financial  organisation  of  their  businesses, 
including the way they  use labour and capital on and 
off the farm. 
This throws into question the longstanding emphasis 
of Australian  policy, especially  for  grains,  on  gov-
ernment  intervention  to  support or stabilise  agricul-
tural prices through marketing boards, in the name of 
orderly  marketing. The  more  so,  in  the  last decade, 
when  foreign  exchange  rates  and  financial  markets 
have  been  deregulated.  Marketing  boards  could 
stabilise  local  currency  prices  for  producers  only 
through  draconian  intervention,  which,  inevitably, 
would  interfere  with  the  response  of producers  to 
developments on the world market. 
Sloppiness on this point was a principal cause of the 
collapse of the Australian wool  reserve price scheme, 
with  all  that  meant  for  wool  growers  and  wool consumers in  all  countries. A not dissimilar story has 
been told about the world tin  industry (Anderson and 
Gilbert 1988. p.  14), where 'the combination of accu-
mulated  production-<:onsumption  imbalance  with 
exogenous  movements  of  foreign  exchange  rates 
resulted in  the deformation of the sixth ITA  [Interna-
tional Tin Agreement] into the defence of a monopo-
listic price floor.' 
Given they no longer have an influence on absolute 
prices,  intervention  by  government-sponsored 
marketing boards has to be justified by the profitability 
and efficacy of marketing activities undertaken by the 
boards.  The  following  discussion  concentrates  on 
wheat,  the  main  crop  in  Australia.  Prices  and 
marketing  of  other  grains  are  affected  by  wheat 
because other grains are substitutes in production and 
consumption and use the same marketing services. In 
any  case,  intervention  in  other  grains  has  been 
modelled on the wheat industry. 
Characteristics of  Wheat Marketing 
The traditional system of wheat marketing in Australia 
had  four  main  characteristics  (Watson  and  Parish 
1982): 
•  the  A  WB  was  the  exclusive  marketer  of wheat 
within Australia and for export; 
•  a  buffer  fund  operated  with  the  objective  of 
stabilising prices through taxes on exports at  times 
of high prices and payments when prices were low; 
•  there was differential pricing between the domestic 
and  export  markets,  and,  within  the  domestic 
market, between wheat for human consumption and 
wheat for stockfeed; 
•  an  elaborate  pool-payment  system  existed  to 
disburse  to  farmers  the  net  proceeds  of sales  on 
various markets, after allowance for marketing costs 
and stabilisation transactions. 
These  comprehensive  provisions  determined  the 
structure  of  marketing  institutions  and  the  per-
formance  of marketing  functions.  Australian  wheat 
pricing policies drove a wedge between prices on the 
world market and domestic prices paid and received by 
producers and consumers. At times, Australian wheat 
producers  received  higher  than  world  prices  and  at 
other  times  received  lower  than  world  prices  and 
which involved costs for trading countries. 
This had  significant effects on  resource  allocation 
and income distribution within the grain industry, and 
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the economic relationship of the grain industry to the 
rest of the economy (Longworth and Knopke 1982). 
Australian  wheat  stabilisation  schemes  remained 
unchanged  in  their  main  features  from  the  intro-
duction of the first (five year) scheme in  1948, itself a 
continuation of wartime measures, until the expiry of 
the  sixth  scheme  in  1979.  Earlier  modifications  to 
wheat marketing had merely  involved tinkering with 
various parameters of the  scheme,  rather than  chal-
lenging  its  underlying  principles.  The changes  that 
occurred in  1979 had involved a considerable amount 
of political conflict and bureaucratic effort in  finally 
convincing wheat growers that previous policies and 
regulations had actually  outlived their usefulness  to 
their intended primary beneficiaries, making deregu-
lation  consistent  with  the  private  interest  of most 
wheat growers, as well  as the public interest (Martin 
1990). 
The process of reform was accelerated by a public 
inquiry into the wheat industry in  1977 conducted by 
the  Industries  Assistance  Commission  (lAC)  (lAC 
1978). The lAC, now the Industry Commission (IC), is 
the  government  agency  responsible  for  reviewing 
assistance arrangements.  As  an  important part of its 
process of investigation, the  IAClIC conducts public 
inquiries  (Mauldon  1975).  The  need  to  account 
publicly for previous policies did a lot to  break down 
resistance to change in  the wheat industry, because it 
revealed that  there were  serious divisions of opinion 
within the wheat growers' own ranks. 
The seventh scheme introduced major changes with 
respect  to  the  financing  of the  scheme,  payment  of 
growers and pricing  on  the domestic  market.  Buffer 
fund stabilisation was eliminated and replaced with a 
(government)  Guaranteed  Minimum  Price  (GMP), 
based  on  a  proportion  of  a  weighted  average  of 
previous prices. This was also referred to as  'under-
writing'. The GMP became the basis of the payment 
system and the financing of the A  WB. The monopoly 
position  of the  A  WB  on  the  export  and  domestic 
market was unchanged. 
One of the most important reasons for introducing 
the GMP was because it had become clear in the 19708 
that  the  pool  payment  system  had  acted  in  a  com-
pletely  contrary  way  to  the  intentions of the  buffer 
fund  and had actually destabilised growers' incomes. 
The  procedures  for  payment  of pools  coneentrated 
receipts from a number of years in years of high wheat 
prices and vice versa (Watson and Parish 1982). Cost oCProduction Pricing 
In  the first significant rebuff to established policies and 
entrenched farmer attitudes. the grievously flawed  'cost 
of production' system for setting prices was abolished in 
1974. Cost of production pricing is invalid for both theo-
retical and practical reasons (Campbell  1944;  Campbell 
and Fisher 1982. pp. 98-10 I). The relationship between 
cost and price is  an  indirect one. No  pricing system can 
completely ignore the demand side:  even more so  for a 
product like Australian wheat, which is  traded predomi-
nantly on the  world market. Cost is  relevant to  farmers 
only in so far as costs affect their decisions on how much 
they wish to produce and offer for sale. 
There  are  four  main  practical  problems  in  using 
pricing formulae based on costs. 
•  What non-cash costs should be included to account for 
depreciation  of capital,  owner-operated  labour  and 
returns  to  capital?  There  are  no  unambiguous 
solutions  to  determining  how  these  items  can  be 
allowed for in total costs. 
•  How  should  costs  be  allocated  between  wheat 
production and  other commodities that  are  produced 
on cereal-livestock farms? Any system that is devised 
must be  arbitrary and can  have  no  logical economic 
basis.  In  the  early  stages  of  Australian  wheat 
stabilisation.  the  practice was  to  subtract all  receipts 
from' sidelines' from total farm costs to find the costs 
that  were  to  be  attributed  to  wheat  growing.  (The 
underlying assumption must have been that no profits 
are  made  from  sidelines.)  When  the  world  price  of 
wool boomed in  1951, this procedure implied that the 
calculated cost of production of wheat was negative! 
•  Costs  vary  substantially  from  farm-to-farm  so  that 
selection  of a  sample,  and  even  the  definition  of a 
wheat farm, affect the estimated cost of production. 
Later Changes 
The  lAC  next  reported  on  the  wheat  industry  in 
1983. The report (lAC  1983)  recommended deregu-
lation of the domestic market, reduction in cost pooling 
and provision of more information to assess the per-
formance of the A WE. Few changes were made in the 
1984  legislation.  Direct  sales  under  permit  were 
allowed for feed wheat, replacing restrictive and almost 
token grower-to-buyer sales which had been allowed 
under the  1974 Act. The lAC was dubious about the 
case for A WB involvement in futures trading but this 
was permitted in the 1984 legislation (Watson 1984). 
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•  Average costs per unit of area have to be converted to 
per unit of output by choosing an average yield. Given 
the  variability  of wheat  yields  in  space  and  time, 
Australian  administrators  had  plenty  of  room  for 
manoeuvre  in  selecting  a  'yield divisor'.  and  hence 
adjusting  prices  in  any  required  direction.  In  that 
sense. official cost of production pricing was largely a 
charade. 
Miller  and  White  (1980,  p.  6),  then  officials  in  a 
position  to  know  what  actually  happened with  cost  of 
production pricing. remarked: 
Although developed  from  objective  Bureau of Agricul-
tural  Economics  survey  data,  the  assessed  cost  of pro-
duction  was  determined  by  the  Commonwealth 
Government after discussions with the Australian Wheat-
growers  Federation  and  other  interested groups.  In  par-
ticular, some of the  imputed  items, such as the  value of 
capital  and  the  owner-operator's  contribution,  and  the 
yield to use  in  calculating a cost per bushel, were subject 
to  extensive  negotiation  ...  Whatever  the  merits  of the 
guaranteed price may have been for other purposes, ...  its 
relationship to  the  world  market  price  was  purely fortu-
itous. It had to be renegotiated between plans. During such 
renegotiations, the level of world prices undoubtedly had 
an  effect  on  the  choice of levels  at  which  some  of the 
variables  that  made  up  the  assessed  cost  of production 
were set. 
Another theoretical objection to cost-based formula 
pricing is  related to  the theories of economic rent and 
asset valuation. If land values are included as a cost, a 
spiral of prices can be set in train with increasing prices 
of wheat-growing  land,  resulting  in  higher  adminis-
tered prices for wheat, resulting in higher land values, 
higher prices and so on.  Using  'cost of production' to 
set  prices  is  a dead end in  the  pricing of agricultural 
commodities. 
Pressures for reform intensified in the mid-1980s 
with  a  sharp  decline  in  prices  associated  with  the 
change of V.S. policy, concentrating the attention of 
the Australian wheat industry on domestic marketing 
costs.  A  Royal  Commission  on  Grain  Storage, 
Handling  and  Transport  was  established  in  1986 
which  found  that greater competition  could  reduce 
marketing  costs  (Royal  Commission  on  Grain 
Storage,  Handling  and  Transport  1988).  The 
combined  effects  of the  Royal  Commission  and  a 
further  lAC  report  (1988)  were  influential  in  the 
far-reaching  changes  in  wheat  marketing  that 
occurred in  1989. In 1989, the method of underwriting was changed to 
provide a government guarantee to A  WB  borrowings 
10 finance payments to wheat growers at harvest, rather 
than a supported price. This was largely in response to 
the substantial payments that were made by the Com-
monwealth under the eighth (1984) scheme, after the 
world  market  had  collapsed  in  the  mid-1980s.  The 
domestic market was deregulated, but the A  WB main-
tained its monopoly on the export market. 
The Wheat Industry Fund was created to establish a 
capital  base  for  A  WB  trading,  and  to finance  value 
adding  activities.  The  Wheat  Industry  Fund  is 
supported by compulsory levies on producers of 2 per 
cent  of their  gross  receipts.  Subsequently,  arrange-
ments were made to make growers' contributions like 
a negotiable asset  through buy-back  provisions. The 
Wheat Marketing Act (1989) also removed the sunset 
provision,  which  under previous Acts had been  five 
years on the life of the A  WB. The A  WB was permitted 
to trade in grains other than wheat on the domestic and 
international  markets.  This extension of powers was 
based on the  belief that there are economies of scale 
(scope)  in  the  provision  of marketing  services.  By 
implication,  it  represented  a ringing  endorsement of 
the AWB's role in Australia's grain trade. 
The emphasis of the 1989 amendments to the Act is 
increasing  returns  to  growers.  The  A  WB  now  has 
power  to  override  State  transport  authorities.  The 
creation of a trading division has allowed the A  WB to 
be  involved in selling grain to the expanding markets 
for feed grains to the dairy industry and cattle feed lots. 
Representation on the A  WB was changed so that it no 
longer  has  a  majority  of  grower  members.  Board 
members  are  now  selected on  the  basis  of their com-
mercial  expertise,  including  grower  members.  In 
practice, the method of selection still allows the Grain 
Council  of  Australia-the  peak  growers'  organi-
sation--to have  considerable  influence on  the  compo-
sition of  the Board. The 1989 Act was amended in 1992. 
Apart  from  the  encouragement given  to  value  adding 
mentioned above,  the  amendments  included extension 
until  mid-l999 of government  underwriting  of A  WB 
borrowings to finance the payment to growers at harvest. 
The A  WB as a Single Seller 
Under  traditional  arrangements,  the  A  WB  had  the 
exclusive  right  to  acquire  wheat  from  farmers  and 
monopoly power to dispose of wheat in  the domestic 
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and export markets. Because of the division of powers 
under the Australian Constitution, regulation of wheat 
marketing required complementary legislation by  the 
Commonwealth  and  State  governments.  Common-
wealth  legislation provided the  A  WB  with its export 
powers.  State  legislation  enabled  acquisition  and 
maintenance of domestic prices different from export 
prices.  The Commonwealth  buttressed  these  pricing 
powers by controlling imports. While a combination of 
Commonwealth  and  State  powers  provided  control 
over external and intrastate trade, there was ambiguity 
about  interstate  trade,  which  is  meant  to  be  'free', 
according to Section 92 of the Australian Constitution. 
Given  thc  conflicting  interpretations  of Section  92, 
considerable uncertainty surrounded interstate trade in 
wheat and other products. Wheat marketing legislation 
was often the subject of challenge and protracted liti-
gation  in  the  courts (Coper  1978).  In  the  event,  the 
ambiguity of the legal situation was overtaken by the 
deeision  to  dereguIate the  domestic market;  partly  in 
1984, and completely in 1989. 
The powers of the A  WB need to be considered from 
at least three angles: 
•  whether the A  WB can achieve  higher prices than 
private traders? 
•  whether  more  competition  for  the  A  WB  would 
reduce marketing margins to the benefit of growers 
and users? 
•  whether  organisational  arrangements  can  resolve 
conflicts  between  growers,  especially  political 
conflicts between growers in different States? 
Each of  these issues is now considered in turn. 
'Single desk' or 'weak selling' 
Weak selling, as  usually defined, means that lower 
prices are  received  in  an  uncontrolled situation  with 
many  competitive  sellers  than  with  a  single  seller 
('single desk'), or with some regulation by a statutory 
body. It is only because the world grain trade is subject 
to  so  much  government regulation  that  the question 
whether  Australian  policies  and/or  selling  arrange-
ments might influence world prices needs to  be con-
sidered. The Australian share of the  world market is 
not  sufficient  to  suggest  that  Australia  would  have 
much market power under normal circumstances. 
Single desk  selling  would  be  expected to  achieve 
increased  prices  only  to  the  extent  that  particular 
markets for Australian exports are freight-advantaged. 
A single seller of Australian  wheat would be able to 
price wheat up to the landed import price offered by the  next  most  favoured  exporter.  The  instability  of 
freight rates in the competitive market for shipping and 
the volatility of the wheat market limits the gains that 
could be obtained from exercising price discrimination 
in this way. 
The export demand for grain from  Australia could 
be inelastic on some markets because of restrictions on 
market access, especially when  other countries have 
single buying agencies. In some cases, other countries 
restrict  access  to  markets  in  ways  which  allow 
exporters to reap some of the benefits.  It  is not alto-
gether clear why they should do this. A possible reason 
is that other instruments of  domestic price support may 
arouse  more  interest  from  groups  in  their  own 
countries  who  are  disadvantaged  by  assistance  to 
farmers. The opportunity could also exist occasionally 
to  collude with other countries with the  intention of 
tuming  the  terms-of-trade  for  wheat  in  Australia's 
favour (Alaouze et al.  1975a). The extent to which the 
exercise  of market  power could  be  exercised  in  all 
these  instances  would  depend  upon  the  absence  of 
retal iation by importers. 
The argument over weak  selling  is  conceptual  and 
empirical.  To  understand  the  controversy  over weak 
selling,  it  is helpful  to  reconsider ideas about markets 
and  price  determination.  As  discussed,  the  'price' of 
commodities has many dimensions. Transaction prices 
are  a  composite  of absolute  prices  and  differentials 
arising  in  separate markets for marketing services. We 
ean  think  of absolute  price  levels  as  determined  by 
underlying  supply  and  demand  conditions-world 
output, consumer incomes and  prices  of substitutes  in 
importing countries. The price differentials, around the 
absolute price, reflect differences in location. time, form 
and quality. The differentials depend upon markets for 
transport, storage, finance, processing and grading. 
A second helpful  idea is  the  'law of onc  price', a 
powerful  way  of thinking  about  the  process,  and 
effects, of competition in  an exchange economy. The 
law of one price requires that, in a competitive market, 
prices will be uniform after the costs of adding (or sub-
tracting)  place,  time  and  form  utility  are  taken  into 
account. This is  a manifestation of the possibility of 
bargaining between buyers and sellers, er arbitrage. 
The third useful  idea from economics is  that price 
determination  and  competition  between  buyers  and 
sellers  in  markets  is  a  discovery  process.  It  is  mis-
leading to think that there is some 'right' price, waiting 
to  be  found.  Any  price  observed  in  a  commodity 
market is transitory. 
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It appears that the controversy over weak selling has 
been conducted at  cross purposes. It is  seldom clear 
whether  the  lower  price  allegedly  obtained  with 
competing sellers refers to an absolute price or differ-
entials associated with marketing services. Little can 
be  done  to  capture  higher  (absolute)  prices  in 
importing  countries  for  products  with  substitutes, 
including alternative  sources of supply.  At  the same 
time, higher prices could be obtained as a reward for 
superior  marketing  effort.  The  A  WB  may  obtain 
higher prices  by  providing  more  services-at some 
cost.  Whether this  is  a  sensible  strategy  is  separate 
from  debates over weak selling. In  practicc, whether 
prices are  low  because of economic fundamentals or 
because traders are pricing grain or marketing services 
cheaply would be difficult to judge in  any real  world 
pricing situation. In the contexts of the concept of price 
discovery  and  the  distinction  between  price analysis 
and marketing analysis, it is impossible to tell if weak 
selling is occurring. 
The argument about weak selling is often rhetorical; 
a facade behind which people hide their predilections 
in  favour  of  orderly  marketing  or  laissez-faire. 
Whether weak selling  is  important for the  Australian 
or Chinese grain  industries should be regarded as  an 
empirical  question  that  can  be  judged  only  on  a 
case-by-case basis. Some important issues that would 
need to be  considered in  a fuller evaluation of weak 
selling are as follows: 
•  market  structure  in  importing  and  exporting 
countries; 
•  the chances of collusion in  buying by single buyers 
playing vendors off against one another; 
•  the costs of providing marketing services by private 
firms  and  statutory  bodies-for  particular 
functions, and functions collectively; 
•  economies  of  size  in  marketing  for  individual 
functions; 
•  the relevance of •  corruption' of world grain markets 
to single desk exportcrs (and importers); 
•  the price information available in individual markets 
for  grain,  including  premiums  and  discounts 
associated with marketing services. 
The case for single desk selling of Australian wheat 
has been investigated in detail by Piggott (1992). The 
results of his analysis are not encouraging. However, it 
is impossible to capture all aspects of the problem in a 
formal  economic  analysis.  The case for  single  desk 
selling is  usually  based on  faith;  in  the ability of the 
A  WB  to  make  use  of superior  market  knowledge, gained  through  trading  in  a  situation  where  other 
exporters are  actively  practising price discrimination 
through targeted export subsidies and importers are in 
a strong position to int1uence the terms and conditions 
of sales (Ryan 1994). 
The A  WB and marketing costs 
Even  if the  A WB  could  extract  premiums  from 
buyers on world markets, this does not automatically 
justify the statutory monopoly powers given to it. Gov-
ernment  could  enable  Australia  to  capture  those 
premiums  by  licensing  private  firms  to  operate  in 
markets  with  restricted  market  access.  If the  rights 
were  sold to private firms,  annually or pernlanently, 
the  benefits  would  accrue  to  the  nation  as  a  whole 
rather  than  be  the  exclusive  preserve  of the  wheat 
industry. There is  no particular reason why economic 
rents that are earned by grace and favour of  the policies 
of foreign governments should be exclusively captured 
by  wheat growers. Licensing arrangements would be 
difficult to administer, however, with some danger of 
discounting of premiums through collusion between 
private exporters. 
Furthermore,  export  licensing  and  single  desk 
selling impose additional costs on the wheat industry 
since  they  limit  entry of other marketing  firms  and 
prevent  competition between  suppliers  of marketing 
services. Costs imposed by export controls or statutory 
marketing have to be compared with any benefits from 
single  desk  selling  (Industry  Commission  1991.  pp. 
48-49}. 
The A  WB is essentially a trading organisation. The 
major investment of trading organisations is  in stoek. 
Business  success  depends  upon  traders  selling  on 
better  terms  than  they  purchase,  including  profits 
made providing marketing services required by  their 
clients. No such test of business success was applied 
to the A  WB and its associated State marketing institu-
tions. The A  WB had the right to acquire wheat com-
pulsorily  from  wheat  growers,  subtracting  all 
marketing and tlnancing costs, before paying  wheat 
growers a pooled price. 
Trading organisations often do not own  the  capital 
facilities  used  in  commodity  marketing.  In  the  Aus-
tralian case, the storage, transport and handling system 
was  not  under the direct control  of the  A  WB. It  was 
owned and operated by State authorities or, sometimes 
in  the case of storage and handling, grower co-opera-
tives given special powers under State legislation. The 
ternlS  and conditions under which these organisations 
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operated  were  specified  in  the complementary Com-
monwealth  and  State  legislation,  which  set  up  the 
A  WB,  and  established  the  framework  for  wheat 
pricing, marketing and stabilisation arrangements. 
Gradually, this system came under increasing strain. 
Marketing  costs  were  pooled  nationally  until  1979. 
This was an  incentive for  prolligate  investment and 
poor administration.  Authorities  in  States where  the 
wheat  industry  was  expanding  rapidly  were  able  to 
shift costs of new capital investments to growers in the 
States with established wheat industries. Not surpris-
ingly,  large  disparities  in  marketing  costs  emerged 
between  the  States,  when  national  pooling  was 
replaced with State pooling of marketing charges after 
1979.  Storage and handling charges ranged  from  $6 
per tonne in  Victoria to $12 per tonne in  New South 
Wales and Western Australia. 
Nevertheless,  similar  problems  existed  with 
State-based  pooling  of  marketing  charges.  State 
transport,  handling  and  storage  authorities  did  not 
have  strong  incentives  to  economise  on  marketing 
costs, or price  services to test  the  demand by  wheat 
growers  for  marketing  services.  Their  costs  could 
always be recovered from growers who had no choice 
in  the services they  were obliged to pay  for.  In  par-
ticular, until  1984, wheat growers had limited ability 
to market  grain outside the regulated system, which 
had been designed for exports. Obviously, some grain 
producers are located close to large domestic users of 
grain with opportunities for savings of  marketing costs 
on both  sides.  Stale transport,  handling  and storage 
authorities  were  vulnerable  to pressures  applied  by 
special  interests  from  their  work-force,  for 
favoured conditions of  employment; from growers, for 
a dcluxe system of handling, which did not carefully 
consider  the  economic  trade-off  between  handling 
costs and delays faced  by  wheat growers at  harvest. 
This  resulted  in  a  marketing  system  which  was 
over-capitalised and costly. 
Eventually,  controversy  over  the  costs  of grain 
marketing in  Australia led  10  the Royal Commission 
into  Grain  Handling,  Storage  and  Transport  from 
1986-88. The  findings  of the  Commission  and  the 
associated comprehensive program of research were 
influential in the  deregulation of the  domestic wheat 
market in  1989 and major changes in the relationship 
between the A  WB and State authorities which gave the 
A  WB  greater  control  and  discretion  in  the  use  of 
marketing services  (Fisher and  Quiggin  1988;  Ryan 
1994).  Compulsion  on  growers  to  use  State  rail systems  was  modi tied  in  some States.  Furthennore, 
deregulation of the domestic wheat trade  limited the 
monopoly pricing powers of  the State authorities. 
During the 19905. ownership of some State handling 
and  storage authorities  has  passed to other hands.  In 
two cases. Queensland and Victoria, the A  WB has been 
interested in becoming a part  -owner of these marketing 
facilities using funds  provided by  the Wheat Industry 
Fund. This has offended growers  in  other States and 
also attracted the attention of the Trade Practices Com-
mission because of potential anti-competitive implica-
tions of A WE involvement in  grain handling. It would 
appear to be against the spirit of the deregulation of the 
domestic market for the A  WB to be involved directly in 
handling and storage. This is a difficult issue to judge. 
For flexibility  in marketing operations and economies 
in  grain handling and  storage,  it  is  sensible for grain 
traders  to  be  vertically  integrated.  In  some  circum-
stances, partial deregulation could turn out to be worse 
than the previous situation,  if the  A  WE  is  precluded 
from participation in handling and storage in the more 
deregulated market that is emerging. 
The A  WB and grower politics 
The  changing  role  of the  A WE  over  the  years 
reflects the interaction of the complex politics of the 
wheat  industry  with  the  competing requirements of 
government,  which  has  to  represent  wider national, 
consumer  and  taxpayer  interests.  The  faltering 
progress towards deregulation of the domestic market 
through  grower-to-buyer  sales  and  a  pennit  system 
over  15  years  is  an  indication  of how  complicated 
those  processes  are.  The  political  behaviour  of the 
wheat  industry  is  also  somewhat  unusual  in  that  at 
several times  in  the earlier history of wheat  stabili-
sation, the net effect of  government intervention was to 
the detriment of wheat growers. Despite these occur-
rences  of negative  assistance which,  although  infre-
quent, were of much greater absolute magnitude than 
when positive assistance  was  provided,  the  political 
organisations  of  wheat  growers  have  remained 
steadfast in their support of  regulation, even though the 
fonn of that regulation has been changed substantially 
over the years (Watson 1982). 
There has always been a strong element of income 
redistribution in the intent, if not the actual effect, of 
Austral ian  wheat  pricing  and  marketing  arrange-
ments.  Behind  the  concern  with  guaranteed  prices, 
price stabilisation and pooling of marketing costs lies 
a tradition dating back to the unfortunate events of the 
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19305, whieh led to the quest for ways of  ameliorating 
the effects on growers of adverse prices arising from 
the vicissitudes of the world market, and of sharing 
the  risks  and  costs  of  marketing  (Whitwell  and 
Sydenham 1991). 
The  wheat  industry  is  diverse  in  several  major 
respects  which,  at  face  value,  should  int1uence  the 
political  attitudes  of  wheat  growers.  The  relative 
hannony amongst wheat growers is therefore difficult 
to  understand.  The economic situation of individual 
wheat growers and their likely attitudes to government 
intervention will be affected by the following: 
•  the  settlement  history  of  different  regions,  the 
distribution of fann size and, hence, the distribution 
of  fann incomes; 
•  climatic and agronomic  features  which detennine 
production  alternatives  crops  and/or livestock, 
particularly  features  affecting  the  riskiness  of 
production and marketing. 
The politics of the wheat industry is complicated by 
the need for the States to ensure the passage of  comple-
mentary legislation necessary to maintain the powers of 
the  A  WE.  The  Federal  system  of  government  in 
Australia is reflected in the structure of fann organisa-
tions. There are some differences in approaches to regu-
lation between States, and within and between the State 
aft1liates of  the national wheat growers' organisation. In 
practice. these  tensions are resolved  by  rotating lead-
ership  of growers'  organisations  between  the  States. 
The most significant changes in wheat marketing have 
coincided with  times  when  leadership at  the  national 
level  was  amenable to change, The early  1980s was 
such a time in the history of wheat marketing. 
The differences  in  attitudes  and  interests between 
the States have had to be reconciled at times by moditi-
cations of the  marketing and  pooling  system,  which 
were obviously  politically  rather  than  economically 
detennined.  The  superior  bread-making  quality  of 
wheats  grown  in  northern  New  South  Wales  and 
Queensland  was  recognised  by  the  payment  of 
premiums for quality. Changes to the grading of wheat 
grown  in  southern  Australia  came  much  later. 
Transport and handling charges were adjusted close to 
State borders to reduce the attractiveness of interstate 
sales  and  reduce  the  chances of legal challenges to 
wheat marketing by disaffected growers. 
In earlier times, there was an allowance to Western 
Australia to reflect its proximity to some major export 
markets. The search for consensus between the States 
necessary  to  achieve  the  legislative  basis  of wheat marketing  made  negotiation  of  wheat  marketing 
arrangements every five years costly and tortuous, and 
neglectful  of economic  efficiency  in  marketing  and 
production (Miller and White  1980). Special conces-
sions even had to be made in the transport of wheat to 
Tasmania,  a  non-wheat  growing  State,  to  enable 
passage of wheat legislation. 
Guaranteed and/or stabilised wheat prices do little to 
stabilise  Australian  farm  incomes,  when  yields  are 
unstable  and  other  commodities  are  important  to 
farmers.  The attraction  to  measures  based  on  prices 
can be explained by suspicion of the price mechanism 
and distrust  of private  marketing  activity,  based  on 
experience of the past, or pure ideology. It  is believed 
by  some  farmers  that  financial  institutions  respond 
favourably  to  demands  for  credit,  if farmers  have 
greater (ex ante) stability in prices. However, financial 
institutions  would  be  foolish  if,  when  incomes  are 
unstable,  the  appearance  of price  stability  affected 
their lending decisions. 
Continuing political support for pooling of marketing 
costs  by  wheat  growers  and  governments  can  be 
attributed  in  part to  pursuit of an  income distribution 
objective-although it is far from obvious that pooling 
could  have or had much effect on  the  distribution of 
income. This issue is taken up below, in a section con-
cerning the economic rationale and effects of pooling. 
Political controversy in the wheat industry has also 
been concerned with the issue of 'grower control' of 
statutory marketing authorities, especially the A  WB. 
Although this controversy has waned in recent years, 
with greater acceptance of the principle that the man-
agement and control of marketing authorities should 
be  placed in  the hands of those technically equipped 
for the task, there are still political pressures within the 
wheat industry to revert to the previous situation, when 
influence  in  farm  organisations  was  the  established 
route to appointment to  positions within the  bureau-
cratic structure of wheat marketing. 
Australian  experience  in  wheat  and  other agricul-
tural  commodities,  suggests  that  the  skills  and 
attributes required for a successful career as a political 
activist in farmer organisations and in  management of 
the  complexities  of agricultural  marketing,  are  not 
commonly shared by the same individuals. Successful 
wheat marketing institutions, public or private, need a 
balance  of experience  and  skills  in  production,  in 
commodity  trading,  in  merchandising,  in  futures 
trading, and  in  accounting. management and finance 
(Miller 1984). 
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Buffer .Fund Stabilisation 
Intervention by governments to influence agricultural 
prices  in  a market-based economy can  be  separated 
into two broad categories: 
•  price  support  programs  that  are  intended to  raise 
prices  permanently above  their  market-determined 
level. 
Instruments  of  price  support  may  be  classified 
further, according to whether their economic effects 
flow  from  interventions  in  agricultural  supply  or 
demand,  or  depend  on  direct  payments  by  gov-
ernment (Lewis 1965). The complexity of  regimes of 
agricultural price support in  most countries derives 
from  the  fact  that  several  methods, each of which 
may be straightforward in principle, are usually used 
in  combination. The choice of price support instru-
ments  in  different  countries  will  depend  upon  on 
what  other economic  instruments  are  available  to 
achieve the objectives of price support. 
•  Price stabilisation which aims to reduce or eliminate 
fluctuations of prices around their average value. 
Thcre are two basic approaches to price stabiIisation 
according to  the means by  which prices are  stabi-
lised:  buffer  funds,  where  revenue  is  transferred 
between  time  periods;  and  buffer  stocks,  where 
prices are stabilised through transactions in  stocks. 
(Buffer stock programs are discussed in more detail 
below in the context of the economics of storage.) 
Fluctuations  in  the  prices  of commodities may  be 
short-term or long-term. Although the emphasis on sta-
bilisation  has  declined  recently,  Australian  wheat 
marketing  arrangements  until  1979  were  intended  to 
tackle  both  sources  of  instability.  The  effects  of 
short-term  fluctuations  were  reduced  by  pooling 
receipts from each harvest and by averaging sales made 
at different times in different markets. Long-term fluc-
tuations were tackled by transferring revenue between 
years, the traditional buffer fund mechanism. 
Stabilisation  policies  (and  price  support)  are  a 
means  to  an  end  rather  than  an  end  in  themselves. 
Concern with agricultural prices usually arises because 
of direct  effects  of  low  and/or  variable  prices  on 
farmers'  incomes.  In  addition,  price  instability  is 
believed  to  have  unfavourable  effects  on  farm 
investment.  Although  farmers  might  be  expected  to 
require a higher rate of return on capital investment to 
offset price risks and therefore reduce investment in a 
risky  environment,  that  issue  is  not  as  clear cut  as 
would first appear (Campbell  1964). Producers  could  invest  more  in  a  risky  financial 
environment  because,  in  the  interests  of long-term 
survival, they elect to reduce their consumption below 
that which would take place with a more stable flow of 
receipts.  A  greater  surplus  is  then  available  for 
investment over a run of years. This latter response to 
price  instability  is  sometimes  called  the  'residual 
funds'  hypothesis.  Investment  is  effectively  being 
treated as a residual, funds are available for investment 
once consumption requirements are satisfied. 
The  balance  of these contrasting  behaviours  is  an 
empirical question, which is difficult to settle one way 
or the other.  Without much doubt,  the record of the 
political behaviour of Australian wheat growers (pre-
dictably) supports the  conclusion that  farmers  prefer 
more stable prices to less stable prices. The more inter-
esting  question  is  the  economic  costs  and  conse-
quences of the measures undertaken in  the pursuit of 
price stability. 
A buffer fund operates by applying taxes at times of 
high prices and making refunds at times of low prices. 
At  least  in  principle,  a buffer fund  is  less  costly  to 
operate than a buffer stock scheme because it does not 
involve  costly  investment  in  storage  facilities  or 
stoeks. However, buffer funds require a system for col-
lection  and  distribution  of  payments  which  may 
impose  strains  on  the  financial  system  and  public 
administration. 
Both  approaches to  stabilisation face  some similar 
problems in  their management. Buffer funds  have to 
establish  procedures  to  set  price  bounds  before 
applying the  tax  and making refunds.  The maximum 
size of the fund has to be established, together with the 
amount of the  tax  and  the  refund per unit  of output. 
Clearly. setting  the  stabilised  price  involves judging 
the  long-run  trend  of prices,  if the  revolving  buffer 
fund is indeed to revolve. The buffer fund will soon be 
exhausted if prices are  set too high.  Excessive funds 
will accumulate if prices are set too low. 
In  the Australian case. the rules for the buffer fund 
provided  for  payments  to  and  from  the  fund  when 
prices  reached certain  levels,  but  with  limits  on  per 
bushel payments. The Commonwealth was liable if the 
fund  was exhausted. but that liability was limited to a 
fixed quantity of  exports and a maximum payment per 
tonne exported (Miller and White 1980, p. 8-9). 
A buffer fund can also be  thought of as a form of 
enforced saving undertaken by government, generally 
via a statutory authority, on behalf of agricultural pro-
ducers. Implicit in the use of buffer fund  stabilisation 
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is  the belief that farmers are  unable to manage their 
own  flow  of funds  using  the  financial  system.  That 
judgment may be based on perceived problems in  the 
ability offarmers to handle variable income streams or 
inadequacies in  the  financial  system.  Again,  it  is  an 
argument that can be settled only by thinking of the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
In developing economies, taxes on exports at times 
of high  prices  have sometimes been used to  insulate 
the economy from fluctuations in receipts from export 
earnings. These export taxes may have motives other 
than  stabilisation  of producers'  incomes  and  were 
occasionally a mechanism by  which the governments 
of some developing countries diverted  income  from 
peasant  producers  in  the  interest  of urban  dwellers 
(Blandford 1979; Anderson and Hayami 1986). 
The  form  and  management  of  past  wheat  price 
policies in Australia was influenced by broader effects 
of  wheat  prices  on  domestic  consumers  and  the 
economy.  In  fact,  the  wheat  stabilisation  scheme  of 
1948 has been interpreted partly as a partial  and  inef-
fective response to problems of inflation in  a situation 
where other remedies to macroeconomic problems were 
either  unavailable  or judged  politically  unacceptable 
(Campbell  1950). This is because wages were indexed 
to consumer prices and bread had a significant weight in 
the  index.  In  an  era of fixed  exchange rates,  keeping 
wheat  prices low was  seen as an alternative to revalu-
ation of the currency, when wheat and other commodity 
prices boomed following the Second World War. 
Moreover,  it  was  also  believed  that  elasticities  of 
supply of agricultural products were low in the agricul-
tural  systems of all  countries.  While these arguments 
probably could not stand up to closer scrutiny, this was 
an  important  part of the  rationale  for  schemes  intro-
duced at the time which were intended to stabilise inter-
national commodity prices (John son 1950; Rowe 1965). 
For  those  attracted  to  these  views,  taxing  wheat 
relative  to  other  products  and  making  the  proceeds 
available at  times of low prices was  not expected to 
have significant effects on resource allocation in Aus-
tralia's multi-product agricultural system. With wheat 
prices stabilised and wool prices determined by market 
forces, this did not prove to be anything like the case in 
Australia (Watson and Duloy 1966). In the past, wheat 
marketing  arrangements  had  substantial  and  delete-
rious effects on resource allocation in Australian agri-
culture  because  they  drove  a  wedge  between  world 
prices and prices received by farmers. Differential Pricing 
Traditional Australian wheat marketing arrangements 
were  characterised by  rigid  separation of the  export 
and domestic markets;  and,  on the domestic market, 
differential pricing of wheat for human consumption 
and  wheat used  for  livestock  feeding  and  industrial 
purposes.  Although  modified  by  the  stabilisation 
objective, these arrangements had similar features to 
the price discrimination which is commonly practised 
in  Australia  to  raise  the  prices  and  incomes  of 
producers  of  some  commodities  permanently,  or 
'home consumption price' schemes. 
Home  consumption  price  schemes  increase 
producer  revenue  by  diverting  supply  from  the 
less-price  elastic  domestic  market  to  the  export 
market. Supply diversion can also be achieved by taxes 
on production that are then used to finance payment of 
subsidies  on exports.  Although  this  is  simpler and, 
especially  important for  Australia, a  constitutionally 
less-controversial method of price support, marketing 
boards are the  preferred mechanism when price dis-
crimination is practised in Australia. Governments are 
attracted to marketing boards because any assistance 
given  to  producers  is  less  visible  than  levy/subsidy 
methods of price support of protecting farmers, which 
are based on using the taxation powers of  the state and 
eonsequently  under  regular  political  scrutiny. 
However, it is a choice which has profound effects on 
the way the marketing system evolves. 
Because of the  existence  of a  home consumption 
price coupled with the objective of stabilisation, prices 
paid by Australian consumers could be above or below 
world prices. The price responsiveness of demand on 
the  Australian  market  was  obviously  less  for  wheat 
used  for  human  consumption  than  price  respon-
siveness  for  wheat  used  in  the  intensive  livestock 
industries,  where  wheat  had  many  substitutes  not 
subject to intervention. 
When  domestic  prices  were  higher  than  export 
prices, producers were tempted to  sell  exclusively on 
the domestic market to avoid dilution of  average (pool) 
prices by lower export prices. Domestic users needed 
to offer only slightly more than the expected average 
price to attract supplies. The temptation to bypass reg-
ulation by  using the interstate market was strong for 
producers and consumers. 
Conversely,  when  domestic  prices  were  below 
export  prices,  grain  users  in  the  intensive  livestock 
industries were able to purchase wheat at a fixed price 
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that did not  reflect  the  value of wheat in  the  world 
market. Sales of feed wheat were therefore unstable, 
with disruption of the coarse grains industries. With a 
most inelastic demand, the effects on the quantity of 
wheat used for human consumption were minimal. 
Differential pricing had a number of effects. Prices 
received by  producers were different to those on the 
world  market.  To  the  extent  that  producers  were 
responsive  to  prices,  the  pattern  of output  did  not 
reflect market circumstances. Consequently, Australia 
did not share in all the gains from high wheat prices in 
the  19505 and  1970s, with adverse effects on produc-
tivity in the long-run (CampbelI  1964). The growth of 
intensive livestock  industries was discouraged  in  the 
early  years  of wheat  stabilisation.  Development  of 
coarse grain industries was impeded by  low domestic 
wheat prices. 
Income was transferred between consumers and pro-
ducers. The transfers could not be justified in  terms of 
reasonable  objectives  with  respect  to  income  distri-
bution  between growers and  consumers,  in  whatever 
direction the redistribution was occurring. Within the 
wheat industry, income was also redistributed because 
of the random effects of yield on stabilisation transac-
tions. Growers, with large crops when prices were high 
and the fund was accumulating, but producing a small 
crop when prices were low, lost money to growers with 
the opposite sequence of  yields (Longworth 1967). 
The experience of the wheat industry in practising 
differential pricing between the domestic and export 
markets  was  not  a  propitious  one.  A  great  deal  of 
energy  was  expended by  governments and  growers' 
organisations  debating  issues  about  the  domestic 
market, when more than 80% of grain was exported. 
Consequently,  much  more  important  issues  con-
cerning the efficiency of the grain transport, handling 
and storage systems for wheat destined for export were 
neglected for many years. 
Home consumption pricing was a political albatross 
for the wheat industry. Growers paid a high price for 
the  regulatory  system.  Paradoxically,  their organisa-
tions  supported  the  status  quo.  Home  consumption 
prices were arbitrarily linked to costs, which inevitably 
moved  out  of line  with  world  prices.  Hundreds  of 
millions of  dollars were lost to the wheat industry in the 
1950s and 1970s when growers subsidised consumers. 
During the  19605,  the situation was reversed, but the 
income transfers were less. The impression was created 
by the transfers in the 1960s that the wheat industry was 
inefficient (Miller 1977). By the 19805, when the wheat industry was in difficulties. the system of priee support 
had  changed.  With  substitution  of  the  GMP  for 
cost-based home consumption prices,  the government 
guarantee was scarcely called upon. Underwriting was 
triggered only once, in 1986-87. Again, the impression 
was  created  that  the  industry  received  substantial 
assistance, which was far from the case. 
Bardsley  and  Cashin  (1990)  pointed  out that  the 
effects  of underwriting  on  assistance  to  the  wheat 
industry  from  1979-80  to  1988-89  cannot  be 
measured solely  by cash payments by  the  Common-
wealth.  Underwriting  reduced  risks  associated  with 
wheat  growers'  returns  in  all  the  years  it  operated. 
Bardsley and Cash  in recognised that the GMP was like 
a put option taken out by the Commonwealth on behalf 
of growers, who were given the opportunity of selling 
to the A  WB at a floor price. Using the theory of option 
pricing, Bardsley and Cash in calculated the assistance 
equivalent of this free price insurance, which had not 
been  considered  formally  in  lAC  estimates  of 
assistance, although the effect had been recognised in 
principle (lAC 1988). The implicit subsidy calculated 
by Bardsley and Cashin from underwriting was around 
$3 per tonne. adding around 3% to estimated effective 
rates of assistance for wheat. 
The Role of  Pooling 
The  principal  forms  of  intervention  in  the  wheat 
industry over the past 50 years have been described by 
Whitwell and Sydenham (1991, p. 286) as follows: 
... orderly marketing was a commitment both to a par-
ticular  institutional  framework  and  to  certain  ideals. 
The ideals were grower equality, the sharing and hence 
minimising  of risks.  and  the  stabilisation  of prices 
(which in turn, so it was thought, would help to stabilise 
incomes). The institutional framework had at its heart a 
national  pooling  scheme,  administered  prices  and  a 
national marketing organisation. This in turn was to be 
organised on the basis of three main principles, namely 
that the pool be compulsory, that the marketing organi-
sation  be  granted  monopoly  powers  and  that  it  be 
grower-dominated. 
Perhaps  the  simplest way  of encapsulating policy 
developments  in  wheat  marketing  during  the  suc-
cession of wheat stabilisation schemes since 1948 is to 
observe  that  there  has  been  a  gradual  retreat  from 
adherence to the pooling principle, correctly identified 
by  Whitwell  and  Sydenham  as  the  cornerstone  of 
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wheat  marketing,  in  both  industry  rhetoric  and 
economic substance. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  most recent  (1989)  Wheat 
Marketing  Act included  three  major changes  which 
have drastically altered the marketing environment for 
grain in Australia: 
•  deregulating the domestic market for wheat; 
•  establishing the  Wheat  Industry Fund  as  a capital 
base for financing  payments to growers and  value 
adding activities; 
•  pennitting the  A  WB  to  trade  in  grains other than 
wheat. 
Deregulating the  domestic market gives producers 
and  consumers  the  option  of  avoiding  pooling  by 
operating  completely  outside  the  regulated  statutory 
framework of wheat marketing. It is Obviously not an 
option that all could take up  in an  industry where the 
export market is predominant. The effect of domestic 
deregulation on the export market is  indirect. Greater 
competitive  pressure  is  placed  on  markets  for 
transport,  storage  and  handling.  Indeed,  domestic 
deregulation can be interpreted as the means by which 
the Commonwealth Government finally succeeded in 
putting enough pressure on the States to reform their 
own  agencies.  Furthermore,  domestic  deregulation 
eliminates economic losses associated with differential 
pricing.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  intensive 
livestock industries have grown rapidly since deregu-
lation of the domestic wheat market in Australia. 
The other two major changes that occurred in wheat 
marketing in  1989 foreshadow a role for the A  WB in 
new business areas, which extend well beyond its tra-
ditional  functions  as  an  institution set  up  to  market 
wheat on behalf of growers. These changes are largely 
prompted  by  the  desire  to  eventually  privatise  the 
A  WB, although that idea is  not uniformly acceptable 
to growers (Malcolm 1994; Ryan 1994). 
Traditionally, the most important manifestations of 
pooling  were  with  respect  to  payment  systems, 
grading, A  WB  selling expenses and storage, transport 
and  handling. The economic effects of pooling vary 
according  to  the  characteristics  of these  marketing 
functions;  in  particular,  according  to  the  extent  to 
which it  is  feasible  for  statutory authorities to price 
marketing  services  close  to  the  long-run  costs  of 
providing these disparate economic activities. 
Pooling of receipts and  charges was  not complete. 
There  were  exceptions  to  full  application  of  the 
pooling principle. Transport costs were not completely 
pooled.  In  all  States,  rail  transport  costs  paid  by growers  were  related  to  the  (radial)  distance  from 
export terminals  at  the  seaboard  and  were deducted 
from the first advance paid to growers at the point of 
delivery. Growers distant from  market were not  paid 
the same price as producers close to the seaboard. To 
ignore  distance  completely  and  pool  rail  transport 
costs  within  a State,  let  alone  Australia  as  a  whole, 
would have defied common sense, strained thc credi-
bility of wheat marketing. and jeopardised the political 
acceptability of regulation in the wheat industry itself. 
Because  the  market  for  land  reflects  distance  from 
markets, pooling of transport costs is clearly irrelevant 
to equity among growers. 
While  complete  pooling  of transport  costs  would 
have been economically damaging,  some  pooling  did 
occur by  having  transport charges related to distance. 
This encouraged  growers to deliver grain  to silos  on 
branch lines close to their farms rather than cart grain to 
busier  lines.  There  are  substantial  differences  in  the 
overhead costs incurred on different railway lines that 
have to be allocated to grain and other freight, according 
to the amount of grain and other traffic carried. 
Charging distance-related freight rates and uniform 
storage  and  handling  charges  was  not  the  most 
efficient way of managing the rail  system or encour-
aging  a  rational  distribution  of delivery  points  for 
grain. Transport costs loom so large in grain marketing 
that policies which encourage waste, in the provision 
or use of grain  transport facilities, need to  be  strenu-
ouslyavoided. 
The major concern with the widespread pooling in 
the  Australian  wheat  industry  was  that  pooling  had 
more  effects  than  the  sharing  of  risks.  Pooling 
averaged  costs  of  performing  various  marketing 
functions amongst growcrs. Wheat growers therefore 
were  not  able to make economic decisions based on 
the costs of marketing services and their valuations of 
the  benefits of marketing  services. Under pooling, a 
standard service, which all  must use, is offered for a 
common  charge.  Charging  an  average  price  for 
marketing services means that  some users  pay  more 
than the costs they  impose on the system. Others pay 
less. Similarly, the service that  is  offered is  less than 
some  would  be  prepared to  pay for.  Others are pur-
chasing more of the service than they would choose if 
a range of services with different characteristics were 
offered for different prices. 
One of the major difficulties when eonsidering the 
economics of pooling  is  that  many  of the  marketing 
services where charges are pooled are capital-intensive. 
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Transport. storage and handling are obvious examples. 
Pricing is  inherently complex in  these cases, whcther 
pricing decisions are made in a private market or under 
public  ownership. Private firms  have  to  recover their 
capital  and  operating  costs  in  the  long-term or face 
insolvency.  In  private  markets.  other  firms  will 
purchase the assets of insolvent firms with revaluation 
of the capital stock. These firm then attempt to recover 
their capital outlay. Public agencies that do not recover 
their capital and operating costs are condemned to be 
reliant on government subsidy. 
There is more to the idea of cost recovery than meets 
the eye, when full cost recovery is advanced glibly as 
the rule to be followed by private or, especially, public 
business. The prices that are necessary to recover costs 
depcnd upon the way capital costs are amortised over 
time.  While  operating  costs  of  marketing  services 
requiring durable capital may be calculated reasonably 
precisely. how the cost of capital is converted into an 
annual  charge  depends  upon  predictions  about  the 
future,  about  which  different  private owners  would 
take different views. 
The unit capital charge required by firms which are 
optimistic about future  prospects will  be  lower than 
that  required  by  pessimists.  In  that  sense,  what  are 
sometimes referred to  as  marginal costs in  economic 
analysis  represent  matters  of  opinion  rather  than 
economic  'fact' (Webb  1977).  Decisions about  how 
capital charges are  incorporated in  prices are part of 
the competitive process between firms. In public enter-
prises,  some  charge  has  to  be  made  for  capital  to 
prevent  extravagant  investments  and  regu-
lation-induced slackness (Quiggin 1988). 
The pooling system required that there be a means 
of paying growers the aggregate pool price based on 
averaging  returns from  all  markets,  with  deductions 
for marketing costs and adjustments when applicable 
for buffer fund  transactions. Until the introduction of 
underwriting, the pool payment system meant that the 
proportion of final  payments paid in the first advance 
varied inversely with the export price. As pointed out 
above,  this  meant  that  the  pool  payment  system 
worked against the  intention  of the  buffer fund  and 
destabilised farmers'  receipts with  drastic effects on 
farm  financial  management.  Only  with  the  deregu-
lation of the domestic market, have growers regained 
the opportunity to gain some control over their flow of 
funds by controlling their time of marketing. 
There are several different ways of thinking about 
pooling. In the first instance, pooling can be thought of as  an  insurance contract whereby producers agree to 
share price risks  (Sieper  1982).  In  markets  for com-
modities,  producers face  considerable uncertainty  in 
deciding what is  the  'real' price given that the prices 
observed in free markets exhibit randomness as well as 
rellect  purely  economic  signals  about  current  and 
anticipated supply and  demand. Therefore, pooling is 
not exclusively a characteristic of statutory marketing, 
although  compulsory  pooling  is  usually  associated 
with  statutory  arrangements.  Although  it  will  not 
always  be  recognised  as  such,  some  pooling  arises 
informally  in private marketing arrangements due to 
limits to the frequency at which prices can be changed. 
When allowed the option, producers often pool prices 
voluntarily  in  private  or  cooperative  marketing 
systems to manage the price risks of sales in different 
markets, in space and time. 
The  view  taken  by  Quiggin  et al.  (1994)  is  that 
pooling  is  like  a  common  property  resource.  This 
contrasts  with  the private  interest  theory of pooling 
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where pooling is  seen to be in the private interests of 
particular groups.  Sieper (1982)  is  the  most notable 
Australian advocate of the private interest view. The 
argument of Quiggin et at.  is  that  'income redistribu-
tional  analysis  is  implausible  because  there  is  no 
obvious reason why grain handling authorities or Gov-
ernments  would  want  to  redistribute  income  in  this 
way: (Quiggin et aJ.  1994, p. 263). 
The  argument  in  favour of the  common  property 
view is  that pooling is  related to  producers' ex ante 
contributions to pools rather than their ex post realisa-
tions, Growers are regarded  by  Quiggin et al. as the 
owners  of  pooling  authorities  rather  than  passive 
victims of  pooling. In effect, growers, who are part of a 
'pool'  see  themselves  as  arranging  investment  in 
capital  facilities,  which  are  characterised  by  sub-
stantial economies of scale and  scope, on  their own 
behalf. Growers obviously  stand to  gain  if they  can 
encourage  technical  efficiency  in  investment  deci-
sions. Requirements for Effective Grain Marketing 
Preliminary Remarks 
It is  now possible to summarise the important themes 
introduced in the paper. Building on discussion of the 
nature of agricultural marketing and the experience of 
grain  marketing  in  Australia,  the  major conclusions 
reached are as follows: 
•  marketing  activities  are  unavoidable  and  involve 
substantial costs, 
- efficiency in marketing has to be considered; 
•  a  marketing  system  is  required  to  coordinate 
production and consumption, 
this  implies  the  need  for  a  system  of  price 
discovery  to  guide  production and  consumption 
and  to  coordinate,  and  price,  provision  of 
marketing services; 
•  complex  markcting  systems  involve  numerous 
changes of ownership, 
- how  commodities  are  bought  and  sold  has 
pervasive economic effects; 
•  grain is diverse in type and quality, 
- grading  and  classitlcation  is  important  for 
producers and consumers; 
•  production  has  become  more  separated  from 
consumption in space and time, 
- this requires transport and storage facilities. 
The  four  aspects  of marketing  discussed  in  this 
section of  the paper are: 
•  price discovery and futures markets; 
•  buying and selling arrangements; 
•  grading and quality assurance,  including economic 
characteristics of grading schemes; 
•  economic functions of storage, especiaJly the roles 
of private and public storage. 
Suggestions  about  future  research  on  grain 
marketing are made in  the  next  section, dealing with 
implications of the  analysis  for  China. Efficiency  in 
marketing is discussed in the conclusion. 
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Price Discovery and Futures Markets 
The process  of competition  is  justified  in  orthodox 
market  economics  because  competition  not  only 
allows the use of known information on costs incurred 
by  firms  and demands  from  households  to  establish 
prices. it  is  also an efficient means of generating the 
information  necessary  to  guide  decisions  by  busi-
nesses  and  households  in  a  situation  where.  in  the 
nature  of the  case.  the  economic  'facts'  helpful  to 
make those  decisions  are  transient  in  nature  (Hayek 
1978).  In effect, competition not only  uses available 
economic information. it also 'manufactures' some of 
the  additional  information  necessary for competition 
to take place. 
Consequently, the concept of price discovery has to 
be considered alongside the concept of price determi-
nation. In agricultural marketing, the prices of interest 
are  the  prices  of  commodities  and  of  marketing 
services. Price discovery refers to the process by which 
buyers and sellers arrive at  prices and the  terms and 
conditions of sale. Price determination deals with the 
theory of pricing and how economic factors influence 
prices under different circumstances. 
Methods of price  discovery have  been categorised 
by Tomek and Robinson (1981, p. 214) as follows: 
•  informal negotiation between individuals; 
•  trading on organised exchanges or auctions; 
•  pricing via formulas; 
•  bargaining  conducted by  producer associations  or 
cooperatives; 
•  administrative  decisions,  both  in  the  private  and 
public sectors. 
These  systems  of price discovery  are  used  in  the 
grain  trade,  often  in  association  with  one  another. 
Trading  on  organised  exchanges  or auctions  is  the 
most  significant  method  because  quotations  from 
central markets are a point of reference for other trans-
actions. Direct marketing of products between farmers 
and processors becomes more important as economic 
activity becomes more specialised and markets more 
concentrated. The  pricing  role  of central  markets  is enhanced, as  distinct from  their role as places where 
actual exchange of products takes place. 
Two types of trading occur on organised markets: 
•  spot or cash trading in  commodities, usually based 
on inspection or samples; 
•  trading in futures contracts. 
Futures  contracts  specify  the  price,  quantity  and 
grade of the commodity to be delivered at a futurc date. 
While futures markets are an important means of price 
discovery, they perform other valuable economic func-
tions.  Futures  markets evolved first  in  the  context of 
storable  commodities.  More  recently,  futures  trading 
has  developed  for  tinancial  instruments.  Futures 
markets need to be considered in temlS of their institu-
tional form; their economic functions and rationale; and 
their place in the grain marketing system. 
Historically,  futures  markets developed  spontane-
ously to meet the needs of traders who wanted to fix 
prices on which they could conduct business at some 
later date. Once time becomes important in the organi-
sation  of economic  affairs,  traders  need  protection 
from  their exposure to price risks, in  respect of their 
investment  in  stocks  and  commitments  they  have 
undertaken  for  forward  sales.  Otherwise,  economic 
coordination in time is costly and extremely vulnerable 
to default (Phillips 1966) 
Early forms of futures market arose in  the Nether-
lands  in  the  late  sixteenth  century,  although  their 
modem  development  dates  from  the  nineteenth 
century when trans-Atlantic trade in commodities was 
growing rapidly (Goss and Yamey 1976). Spontaneous 
development of forward and futures markets has also 
occurred in  contemporary China, in  another situation 
when markets are developing rapidly (Watson  1987). 
Futures markets  are  different  from  forward  markets, 
although they  usually develop from  forward markets. 
Futures markets are distinguished by the formal nature 
of their institutions  and practices. and  the  protection 
afforded against default. 
There are  key  aspects of procedures  followed  on 
futures markets that should to be described before pro-
ceeding to a discussion of their economic functions. 'A 
futures contract is a legal contract, enforceable by the 
rules of the exchange on which it is traded, to deliver 
or accept delivery of a definite amount of a commodity 
during a specified month at a specitied price' (Tomek 
and Robinson 1981. p. 230). Trading is organised by a 
clearing house which keeps records of all transactions. 
The responsibility of members of a futures exchange is 
to the clearing house which is on the other side of each 
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transaction.  Non-members  of  the  exchange  (the 
'public') deal through members of the exchange. 
Traders  have  the  option  of making  delivery  on 
contracts  in  the  delivery  month,  but delivery  in  the 
physical sense seldom occurs because traders take off-
setting positions to discharge the obligation to deliver 
or accept  delivery.  Traders  on  futures  markcts  are 
usually  classified  as  'hedgers'  or  'speculators' 
according to the trading strategy that has been adopted. 
Hedgers  are  defined  as  traders  who  have  taken  an 
opposite  poSition  in  the  futures  market  from  thc 
position  taken  in  the  spot  market.  This  strategy 
protects hedgers from price changes during the life of 
the contract. Futures prices and spot prices converge as 
the contract approaches the delivery time. The option 
of delivery ties the two prices together at the maturity 
of  the contract. 
Speculators take positions with the expectation of 
making profits through price changes in the time that 
contracts are held. The distinction between hedging 
and speculation is somewhat artificial. All traders in 
futures  (and  other)  markets  behave in  ways  which 
best  advance  their  economic  situation.  Rational 
producers or merchants would not engage in  a short 
(selling) hedge if they believed that there was abso-
lutely no chance that prices would fall in the time that 
stocks (inventories) were held. Similarly. merchants 
would  not  take  long  positions  (buying  hedges)  in 
futures  markets,  if  it  were  strongly  believed  that 
prices  would  fall  so  that  protection  against  price 
increases was not required. Hedging therefore should 
be considered as part of the business strategy of firms 
with obligations in the physical market, not a routine 
risk-shifting device. 
The futures  price for a storable commodity cannot 
exceed the spot price by more than the cost of storage. 
This  is  because  it  would  otherwise  pay  traders  to 
purchase  the  commodity and sell  a  futures  contract. 
The  commodity could then  be  delivered  against  the 
futures  obligation  and a guaranteed  profit  would be 
achieved. The resultant sales of futures contracts and 
purchases of grain  under these circumstances restore 
the  difference  between  spot  and  futures  prices  (the 
basis) to no more than the cost of storage. 
There is no logical limit to the size of the negative 
basis (futures price is less than the current spot or cash 
price). A negative basis occurs when  stocks are low 
relative to expected supplies - such as at the end of a 
crop year, when a new harvest is anticipated. The cele-
brated theory of the price of storage has explained the negative  basis  in  terms  of the  convenience yield  of 
holding small quantities of  stocks to maintain business 
and continuity of operations (Working 1949). 
It  follows  that  the  existence  of futures  markets 
greatly assists the carrying of stocks of seasonally-pro-
duced  commodities.  However,  there  are  important 
requirements for the success of futures trading. In par-
ticular,  a futures  market  clearing association  can  be 
interpreted as a method of coping with risk of default 
(Anderson and Gilbert  1988). If rigidly enforced, the 
risk  of default  is  eliminated  by  the  margin  system 
through which additional collateral (equity) is  posted 
on positions that suffer adverse price movements. 
Gains and losses are therefore taken as they occur on 
futures  markets.  Each  participant  is  'marked to  the 
market',  providing  an  automatic  protection  against 
default.  By  contrast,  in  forward  markets,  there  is 
always one unhappy party  to  a transaction,  with the 
temptation to walk away from a forward contract. Gray 
(1976) described the system of margin deposits as the 
most  important  financial  innovation  in  the  devel-
opment of futures trading. 
Futures markets  for grain are  important marketing 
institutions  in  North  America  and  Europe  in  facili-
tating  the  supply  of private  storage,  and  associated 
marketing and processing functions.  Futures markets 
are  central  to  the  operations  of  marketing  firms. 
However.  farmers'  use  of  futures  markets  is 
minimal-less than  10% of U.S. farmers use futures. 
Futures  markets  are  not  important for  agricultural 
industries in Australia. Most obviously, this is because 
of past  policies  which  transferred  risk  management 
from  farmers and marketing tirms to public agencies. 
However, there are other reasons-some subtle, which 
make  the  lack  of interest  of Australian  farmers  in 
futures  trading a rational response to their economic 
environment  rather than  ignorance,  which  advocates 
for futures trading are inclined to imply. 
Grain futures markets would not be expected to have 
the same significance in  Australia as other countries, 
because grain-feeding industries are not as important. 
Furthermore, other means of risk management such as 
enterprise  diversification  and  financial  management 
strategies have evolved in  Australia. Futures markets 
have to compete as risk management instruments with 
other mechanisms.  In  Australian  broadacre farnling, 
there  is  a powerful  incentive for enterprise diversifi-
cation  between  crops  and  livestock  because  greater 
efficiency is possible in the use of labour, which can be 
used  year-round  by  integrating  the  flexible  seasonal 
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tasks  of  sheep  and  livestock  production  with  the 
time-specific demands of crop production. In addition, 
the temporal patterns of the  effects of weather varia-
tions  on  output  have completely different  character-
istics for crops and livestock. Crop yields are sensitive 
to  weather variations  in  the  short-term.  but  quick  to 
recover. Livestock products have the opposite pattern. 
This  reduces  the  effect  of  climatic  variations  on 
aggregate  output  on  mixed  farms.  This  is  another 
powerful  reason  for  enterprise  diversification  under 
Australian broadacre farming conditions. 
Once enterprise diversification is practised because 
of these special relationships in production, a degree of 
income  insurance arises  inevitably  because prices of 
crop and livestock products are determined independ-
ently.  Consequently,  the  reduction of financial  risks 
associated  with  enterprise  diversification  does  have 
characteristics  something  like  a  'free good'  in  Aus-
tralia's  grain/livestock  farming  areas.  This  is  very 
different  from  the  situation  in  North  America  or 
Europe,  where  specialised  production  is  more 
common. Farmers with  trading margins to protect in 
specialised  farming  systems  are  most  likely  to  use 
futures markets. 
For several reasons, futures markets are unlikely to 
be  important  for  farmers  in  most countries. Usually, 
farmers  will  find  that  saving and borrowing through 
the financial system is  the most convenient means by 
which risk can be managed. It should be stressed that 
futures markets are much more important to processors 
and  traders than  individual  farmers.  Farmers benefit 
because marketing and  processing  is  more  efficient. 
Futures  markets  are  useful  because  they  allow 
marketing firms to specialise because they are able to 
shift  risks.  Futures  markets  increase  the  range  of 
options  available  to  marketing  firnls.  For  China, 
further development of futures  markets is  potentially 
useful  to marketing agencies because of their contri-
bution  to  greater trade and  regional  specialisation in 
grain production and grain-based industries. 
In effect, futures markets allow decisions about the 
time  of selling  grain  to  become  part  of a conscious 
marketing strategy rather than a residual one. Similar 
transactions  are  possible  through  international  grain 
merchants.  It  is  also  possible  to  increase  or  protect 
industry revenue through forward or futures  transac-
tions in money and freight markets. 
A  characteristic  of successful  commodity  trading 
companies is that they organise their affairs to concen-
trate on the  provision of marketing  services  to  their customers. In a world of uncertainty. this requires that 
traders minimise effects of price risks on the survival 
of their operations. In  other words, they do not spec-
ulate.  [n  practice, hedging will not be performed in  a 
routine  fashion.  Specialised  traders  will  use  their 
knowledge  of market  developments  acquired  in  the 
performance of their other marketing functions. 
An important role of futures markets is  to focus the 
attention  of large  numbers of buyers and  sellers  on 
commodity prices. In that process they aid the process 
of price discovery,  shift  risks  to  market  participants 
willing and/or able to bear risks of price changes and 
allow  intermediaries  to  concentrate  on  the  per-
formance of marketing functions. 
Buying and Selling Arrangements 
How commodities are bought and  sold has pervasive 
effects on production and consumption. In recent years, 
an elaborate system of retail and wholesale markets has 
developed rapidly in China following economic reform 
and  substantial  deregulation  of the  economy.  Most 
aspects of the retailing and wholesaling of grain lend 
themselves  to  coordination  by  the  price  mechanism. 
Even on small farms, output is large relative to the daily 
needs of the  consumer. For a cash grain economy to 
emerge,  a  network  of assemblers,  wholesalers  and 
retailers  is  necessary  to  provide  the  small  parcels  of 
grain required regularly by consumers. 
With diverse products like grain, attention has to be 
given to quality and customer needs. Large organisa-
tions are unlikely to provide the same service as small, 
local and accountable businesses. The customer is best 
placed to express her/his requirements with a decen-
tralised marketing system and, in particular, will be in 
a position to act quickly if dissatisfied. 
As markets evolve at the local  level, producers and 
consumers will be reasonably well-informed about the 
qualities of grain and will be able to express their pref-
erences  through  their  sales  and  purchases.  The 
situation becomes more complicated as private trade in 
grain extends between regions and between the coun-
tryside  and  urban  centres.  Quality  control  will  then 
become  more  of an  issue  and  mechanisms  will  be 
required to solve disputes about prices and technical 
qualities  of grain.  Price  reporting  and  provision  of 
local inspection services guaranteeing the integrity of 
weight and measures will contribute to the confidence 
of buyers and sellers as the market is widened. 
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More difficult issues come into play with respect to 
inter-regional  trade  in  grain.  In  China,  inter-regional 
trade  is  occurring  in  both  directions-buying  and 
selling.  Decisions have to  be taken  about the advan-
tages  of single  desk  buying  as  well  as  single  desk 
selling. The objectives of provincial governments have 
to be reconciled with those of the national government. 
The Chinese grain economy is  so large  that  it  is  not 
feasible that centralised operations could be more suc-
cessful than trading decisions taken at  the local level. 
The  information  needed  to  exercise  control  is  sub-
stantial  in  a  situation  where  inter-regional  trade  is  a 
balancing item. Prima facie, the arguments in favour of 
single desk buying are slightly stronger than those for 
single desk selling. This is because government-to-gov-
ernment relationships may be involved. This difficult 
economic question is worth exploring further. 
Grading and Quality Assurance 
The economic role of grading of agricultural products 
can be thought of most simply as  sorting undifferen-
tiated  commodities produced  on  farms  into  various 
grades before offering the grades to consumers. Output 
from farms will comprise several grades; deliberately, 
because of conscious plans by farmers to differentiate 
their product; or accidentally, because agriculture is  a 
production  process over which  farmers  do  not  have 
complete control. Consumers have different tastes and 
incomes, within and between the groups to whom the 
commodity is sold. 
Grading  allows  price  premiums and  discounts  for 
different grades of the commodity to emerge around 
the  average  price  for  the  undifferentiated  product. 
Grading  is  an  important  aspect  of the  coordination 
function of marketing, guiding what will be produced 
and how it  will be sold. There are economic benefits 
and costs in  grading from  the  points of view of both 
producers and consumers. 
On  the  demand  side,  grading  is  advantageous 
because  it  allows  consumers with  different  incomes 
and tastes to express their separate demands for grades 
of the product. Low income consumers will be able to 
purchase  cheaper  grades  of the  commodity,  which 
would be impossible if the  product were  undifferen-
tiated. Grading always represents an improvement for 
consumers, because consumers have the option of pur-
chasing  the  commodity  in  the  proportions  of  the 
ungraded product. The case  for  grading  is  more  problematic  on  the 
supply side. Farmers benefit from  the introduction of 
grading  to  the  extent  that  their  pattern  of  output 
matches  the  premium  grades  and/or they  gain  from 
lower costs through specialising in the production of a 
particular  grade.  Inevitably,  some  producers  were 
receiving a higher price for less-preferred grades of the 
product,  before  grading  was  instituted.  (The  under-
lying economics of grading has much in common with 
the economics of pooling.) More costs of adjustment 
are involved for producers in  shifting their pattern of 
production following grading than is the case for con-
sumers,  who  can  change  their consumption  patterns 
more or less without cost. 
The fact that price differentials emerge after intro-
duction  of  grading  does  not  constitute  an  over-
whelming  case  for  more  grading  and  segregation. 
Costs  of  grading  should  be  considered.  Although 
grading adds value to products, it is essential that there 
is a clearly defined market for the product and grading 
is  profitable. Grading raises different issues for grain 
than other commodities. This is  because once grades 
are commingled, grain cannot be segregated. 
Grading  comes  to  the  fore  in  agricultural 
marketing  once  output of agricultural  commodities 
exceeds  the  requirements  of  bare  subsistence. 
Problems related to inadequate systems of grading in 
the  past  emerged in  China following  the  economic 
reforms of 1978. Matching supply 10 demand was not 
a  problem  when  shortages  existed  during  the  two 
previous decades. When incomes rose rapidly in the 
1980s, consumers were more selective in  their pur-
chases.  In  the  absence  of  grading  systems  that 
reflected consumer valuation of quality differences 
and  the  costs  10  producers  of producing  separate 
grades, the Chinese Government was left with excess 
slOcks of the poorer qualities of grain which proved 
difficult to sell (Sicular 1988, p. 290). 
Grading  has  both  technical  and  economic  dimen-
sions.  Grade  standards  have  to  be  established  and 
credible means of communicating them  to  producers 
and  consumers  are  required.  The  critical  economic 
issue  is  the role  government should play  in  grading. 
Government  usually  will  have  to  guarantee  the 
integrity of grading. The longer the marketing chain, 
the more difficult it becomes for buyers and sellers to 
agree and enforce terms and conditions of sale. 
It should  be  noted  that  the  absence  of standard 
grades developed and  enforced  by  government does 
not  mean  that  grading  does  not  exist.  Information 
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about  quality  can  be  transmitted  informally  by 
members of  a trade. 
Government  has  an  obvious  role  in  providing 
inspection  services  in  international  trade,  which  are 
necessary  10  satisfy  protocols  with  foreign  govern-
ments. Sometimes the grading standards  imposed by 
i'oreign  countries  are  unreasonable  and  effectively 
non-tariff barriers to trade. The recent GATT Uruguay 
Round succeeded in achieving international agreement 
on rules of conduct for sanitary and phytosanitary pro-
cedures,  directed  towards  legitimate  concerns  with 
reasonable quarantine standards. 
In recent years, there has been a reconsideration of 
the  characteristics  of  goods  and  services  which 
determine  their  suitability  for  market-based  organi-
sation. This has led to re-examination of the economic 
case  for  government  involvement  in  grading  and 
inspection. The following notes on grading are based 
on  a  paper  by  Wills  and  Harris  (1994),  developed 
mainly  in  the  context  of Australian  trade  in  meat. 
Many of the same observations apply to grain. 
Goods can  be  thought of as  being  'search', 'expe-
rience' or 'credence' goods, according to the method 
used  by  buyers  to  obtain  information  about product 
characteristics. Consumers. retail or wholesale, cannot 
ascertain all  the desirable attributes of grain by direct 
inspection, or 'search'. Some of these attributes will be 
immediately  experienced  in  use,  such  as  taste  and 
freedom  from  contamination.  Because  this  infor-
mation will be used by consumers in deciding whether 
to  make  repeat  purchases,  'experience'  goods  can 
generally be traded freely on the basis of the reputation 
of firnls.  Some other attributes (of 'credence' goods) 
cannot be traced back to a particular supplier, because 
it will be some time before the effects are noticed by 
consumers, if at all. 
Credence goods, therefore, are  usually certified on 
the  basis  of  official  inspection  by  exporting  and 
importing countries. There is  no reason, in  principle, 
why trade in credence goods could not be based on the 
reputation of private firms, as is obviously the case in 
world trade in electronic goods, beer and wine. Private 
trade  in  credence goods  will  be  successful  if buyers 
can  be  convinced  that  sellers  have  enough  to  lose 
through  misreprescntation.  In  essence,  this  is  the 
function of company branding and  other devices like 
warranties that both establish and maintain reputation. 
Establishing  reputation  by  private  firms  involves 
cost and time; a process which is almost certainly char-
acterised by economies of size. This is why small firms and/or new firms find it difficult to trade in credence 
goods. The variability of international trade in grain is 
also an impediment to using private brands to establish 
reputation in the grain industry. 
Grain clearly satisfies the criteria that define both 
experience and credence goods. International trade in 
products  like  grain  creates  serious  problems  in 
quality  assurance.  Multinational  firms  and  joint 
ventures are one method of solving the difficulties in 
transmission  of information  about  quality  between 
buyers and sellers. 
Because of a  lack of objective  information  about 
grain quality,  foreign  buyers are  often placed in  the 
position  of using  country  of origin  as  a  proxy  for 
judging quality. This leads naturally to calls for regu-
lation  of quality  by  the  governments  of exporting 
countries  to  protect  firms  from  the  irresponsible 
behaviour of  others. There are two principal issues that 
have  to  be  considered  with  respect  to  official 
inspection schemes: 
•  Individual private firms still have some incentive to 
cheat because their individual reputations are not on 
the  line;  nor do  they  have  the  same  commercial 
incentive  to  use  the  normal  mechanisms  for 
guaranteeing buyers  that  their products  are  of the 
required quality. 
•  The  method  and  costs  of  providing  official 
inspection have to be considered, including how the 
costs of inspection will be recovered. 
As a practical matter, grain exporting countries have 
no real choice but to have official inspection arrange-
ments.  Health  is  a  politically  sensitive  issue. 
Consumers of credence goods are not in a position to 
protect themselves and expect governments to do so on 
their behalf.  It is  most  unlikely  to  be  a  satisfactory 
strategy to rely exclusively on country of origin as the 
basis on which trade in grain is conducted. 
The system of product description has to cope with a 
range of types and gmdes of grain. A coherent public 
or private  marketing strategy should always provide 
for disposal of output which is not of the most desired 
grade, so long as the grades are accurately described. 
When  private  firms  arrange  their  own  quality 
control systems, they have powerful  incentives to do 
so  at  least  cost.  This  does  not  apply  to  official 
inspection schemes. This is an argument for recovery 
of inspection costs from exporters. Another argument 
is  that exporters  receive  the  benefits of grading and 
therefore should be expected 10 pay. 
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Irrespective of theoretical  arguments. it is  a matter 
of fact  that  quality  standards  of export  wheat  are 
higher,  in  the  sense  of the  reliability  of grades  in 
meeting  consumer  requirements,  under  the  closely 
regulated  Australian  system  than  the  more 
market-based V.S. wheat marketing system. 
Storage 
Storage enables the supply of a commodity to be redis-
tributed in  time and pernlits divergences between the 
rate of production and the rate of  consumption (Parish, 
undated). Even in  a world of certainty, storage would 
be  undertaken  because of seasonality of production; 
changing demand over time; and economies of size in 
production  and  distribution  which  mean  that  it  is 
cheaper to obtain large quantities at intervals and store 
the product until it is used. The first and third of these 
explanations are obviously important for the storage of 
gmin  between  harvests  and  storage  of locally-pro-
duced or imported grain  consumed  by  the  non-farm 
population. 
In  a world of certainty. storage would  not  present 
many  problems.  The  major  problem  would  be 
arranging the physical aspect of storage; in particular, 
providing facilities which maintain the quality of  grain 
and minimise losses in the period that grain is stored. 
Grain is  subject to damage from  many  sources. The 
importance of investing in scientific knowledge of the 
postharvest treatment of  grain and all technical aspects 
of  grain storage should not be underrated. 
The difficult issues arise because of uncertainty of 
production and consumption. Surpluses occur because 
of better-than-average harvests in countries which are 
more or less  self-sufficient  in  grain.  Surpluses  also 
occur for trading countries when demand is  less than 
anticipated. Storage is required in both instances. How 
much  storage  should  be  provided depends  upon  the 
benefits and costs of storage which.  in  turn,  depend 
upon  the  variability of production and  consumption; 
the  price  responsiveness of supply  and  demand;  the 
costs of storage, most notably, the actual or imputed 
interest costs of funds tied up in stock; and the size of 
the  market  over  which  the  risks  of surpluses  and 
shortages are being spread. 
For individuals or firms the incentive to store is an 
expected rise  in  the value of the commodity. In  the 
absence of futures  or forward  markets, expectations 
may  not  be realised and  individuals require a higher return on their investment in  stocks to offset risks of 
losses during the period of storage-a 'risk premium'. 
This would be  reflected in  lower prices for producers 
at harvest. As explained above. futures markets enable 
the  return  from  storage  to  be  known  with  certainty. 
This  is  an  example  of the  observation  made  above 
about  futures  markets.  Shifting  price  risks  enables 
marketing firms to specialise in the provision of other 
marketing  functions  and  allows  marketing  services 
like storage to be performed at lower cost. 
The economics of storage cannot be separated from 
the  processes  of price  discovery  and  price  determi-
nation. Pricing grain over time requires some form of 
speculation.  The  important  issue  with  respect  to 
storage  is  whether it  should be  performed by  private 
firms or public agencies. Does the free market provide 
an  appropriate  means  of  organising  storage?  The 
question, as with many other issues concerning price 
stability,  has  been analysed at  some  length  with  no 
overwhelming conclusion pointing in  either direction 
(Schmitz 1984). The classic work in an extensive theo-
retical  genre  is  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  (1981).  After 
engaging in conjecture along standard lines of inquiry, 
some  pragmatic  comments  arc  offered  on  the  Real-
politik of storage, based on Australian experience with 
wheat and wool. 
Storage  has  features  that  lead  to the existence of 
private monopoly, especially at  the local  level. There 
are economies of  size in storage which create problems 
of entrv  for  new  firms.  Specialised  knowledge  is 
required  to  trade in  commodities over a long  period. 
Speculators have the potential to exploit producers and 
consumers. Little wonder governments and producers 
have  sought  to  limit  private  speculators,  regulate 
private  storage  or provide public  storage.  An  alter-
native approach for government would be to provide 
or  encourage  price-reporting  services,  including 
futures markets, offsetting the danger of concentration 
of information in a few hands. 
The benefits of storage will be maximised when the 
marginal benefit of storage equals the marginal cost of 
storage. In a well-functioning market, with many firms 
engaged  in  speculation  and  storage,  the  maximum 
benefits of storage occur when the expected price dif-
ference between buying and selling periods equals the 
marginal cost of storage. A monopolist, local  or oth-
erwise, would attempt to equate the marginal cost of 
storage with  marginal  revenue  from  storage.  With  a 
downward-sloping demand curve, marginal revenue is 
less  than  price.  Consequently,  the  prediction  from 
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economic theory is that less grain would be stored with 
monopoly  storage  than  with  competition  in  the 
provision of storage. 
The situation changes if producers are organised in a 
marketing  cartel.  Marketing  cartels  then  assume  the 
role  of  speculators  as  well  as  providing  storage 
services. As  speculators, producers may be willing to 
accept  some  loss  or  less  profit  on  storage,  provided 
they receive compensating gains as producers. In this 
situation, the opportunity producers have  to  practise 
price discrimination in  setting the absolute price also 
has to be considered. Producer marketing cartels will 
consider  the  possibilities  of  influencing  prices  in 
buying  and  selling  periods,  as  well  as  returns  from 
storage  per se.  It  is  therefore  unclear as  to  whether 
monopoly in  the storage industry would lead to more 
or less storage than a private market for storage. 
Given the l1uctuations occurring in the price of  com-
modities  and  the  catastrophic  effects  that can occur, 
national  and  international  attempts  at  price  stabili-
sation  are  easily  understood.  Buffer  stock  schemes 
have been  used  for a range of storable commodities, 
whereby an  official body  attempts to stabilise prices 
and guarantee availability of supplies through official 
speculation, That is. by  'buying the commodity cheap 
and selling dear'. 
Buffer stock schemes have a most chequered history 
internationally,  and  their  frequent  failure  has  been 
attributed  to  a  mixture  of conceptual  and  adminis-
trative difficulties (Gardner 1985). Storable commod-
ities  like  grain  are  subject  to  peaks  in  prices  when 
unforeseen  increases  in  demand,  or  shortages  of 
supply, mean that stocks are  insufficient to  moderate 
price rises (Wright and Williams 1990). The danger for 
a buffer stock scheme is that the reserve price follows 
these peaks upwards, because the change is regarded 
as permanent by  the managers of the scheme. Behind 
the general enthusiasm of politicians for buffer stock 
schemes, national and international, hides the common 
and superficial confusion between the worthiness of an 
objective  (more  stable  prices)  and  the  chances  of 
bringing  that  objective  to  fruition.  The  actual  per-
formance of buffer stock schemes has not lived up to 
these expectations. 
Two economic problems stand out in administration 
of  official stabilisation schemes: 
•  the difficulty of forecasting prices; 
•  the inevitable tendency of public storage to displace 
private storage. Despite the enormous amount of effort devoted  to 
forecasting commodity prices, there  is  no convincing 
evidence that these efforts have been worth while. In 
fact,  orthodox market economics and common sense 
teaches that prices cannot be forecast, rather than that 
they  can.  In  well-functioning  commodity  markets, 
prices will reflect available information on current and 
forthcoming supply and demand. If any credible infor-
mation  about  forthcoming  prospects  were  available, 
that information would have already have been incor-
porated  in  the  current  price.  For  information  to  be 
genuinely new, it  must have arrived at random. Oth-
erwise, it would have been anticipated and reflected in 
the  existing  price.  This  simple  theory  is  easiest  to 
understand in  the case of perishable products. It does 
not require much modification in  the case of storable 
products. Storage has the effect of spreading periods of 
unusually high or low demand over several periods. 
Even  if prices  could  be  forecast  successfully  by 
well-informed  administrators,  the  theoretical  attrac-
tiveness of buffer stock schemes is diminished once it 
is  recognised  that  public  storage  drives  out  private 
storage.  The  stockholding  task  then  becomes  larger 
than was envisaged. 
Like  economic  activity  in  the  private  sector, 
economic  activity  in  the  public  sector  must  be 
managed. The chances of buffer stock schemes being 
successful  depends  on  the  quality  of their  adminis-
tration. Prices have to be set taking account of long-run 
trends in supply, demand and prices. There will be the 
temptation for producer and consumer interests to con-
centrate  on  short-run  developments.  Because of the 
tendency  of  agricultural  prices  to  decline  in  the 
long-run,  substitution  possibilities  with  uncontrolled 
products and supplies available from outside the buffer 
stock  arrangement,  buffer  stock  schemes  are  vul-
nerable  to  the  short-sighted  behaviour  of producers 
tempted  to  push  price  beyond  reasonable  market 
expectations. 
Successful buffer stock schemes require strict codes 
of conduct and  professional,  strong and independent 
operation.  A  reasonable  analogy  is  the  autonomy 
granted  to  Central  Banks.  Recent  unfortunate  expe-
rience in the Australian wool industry provides a spec-
tacular example of the perils of allowing producers too 
much influence over buffer stock schemes, especially 
in  an  environment  where  the  source  of volatility  in 
prices has changed dramatically (Watson 1990). 
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Public stockholding is not justified for the Australian 
grain industry. The A  WB follows a policy of  selling the 
crop each year with only limited carry  over to maintain 
supplies to the local market. The main reason for this is 
the unpredictability of export prices. Prices can just as 
easily move in  either direction. The cost of storage is 
always  positive.  Consequently,  the  expected  net 
revenue  from  storage  is  negative  (Alaouze  et  al. 
1978b). The only circumstance under which  it  would 
pay Australia to store from season to season would be if 
the world market is over-supplied and it is  known that 
other countries  are  restricting  their sales  to  increase 
prices (Alaouze et al. 1978a). 
Storage policy  is  more  complex for  countries like 
China, which is close to self-sufficiency in grains. The 
motive for stockholding is food security not price sta-
bilisation as with buffer stock schemes. There are sub-
stantial differences  in  stockholding for food  security 
from  buffer stock schemes. The costs of shortfalls in 
supply are substantial. Fortunately, China has a range 
of crops  and  harvest  times  in  its  flexible  cropping 
system. Imports of grain are a cheap way of managing 
food  security, particularly because the  form  of price 
support practised in the United States effectively guar-
antees that supplies of grain will be available. 
An efficient storage system also requires adequate 
transport and physical storage facilities, together with 
institutions  like  futures  markets  which  generate 
economic information and enable pricing of grain over 
time. Detailed mathematical and statistical research on 
grain storage in  China using the techniques of opera-
tions research is likely to be a most fruitful activity. 
The key policy question for the Chinese authorities 
is  to decide who is  in  control of storage operations. 
While  there  are  good  arguments  for  decentralising 
decision-making in  most aspects of grain marketing, 
the  argument  is  different  with  respect  to  strategic 
stocks.  Coordination  is  required  for  stocks  held  for 
food  security  purposes.  Provincial  or  local  govern-
ments, whether in grain surplus or deficit regions, are 
unlikely to  face the same imperatives as  the  national 
government. 
The mathematics of inventory theory suggest that a 
smaller  strategic  stock  of  grain  for  food  security 
purposes is possible, the wider the market over which 
grain  is  stored.  While  stocks held  for  food  security 
purposes need to  be  held in  a range of locations for 
reasons  of  flexibility,  the  stocks  should  be  under 
central control. Some Implications for Grain Marketing in China 
The Chinese authorities, like their Australian counter-
parts,  have to  reconcile  competing objectives in  the 
design and implementation of agricultural marketing 
arrangements.  In  both countries, the history of grain 
marketing and attitudes of producers have to be taken 
into account.  What is  possible  in  marketing  reform 
depends  on  what  is  understood  and  acceptable. 
Reform of grain marketing should be accompanied by 
plans  for  implementation  and  consideration  of 
second-round effects. 
The  objectives  of  agricultural  marketing  policy 
include the following: 
•  minimisation of marketing costs; 
•  enhancing the coordination function of marketing; 
•  creating public and private marketing institutions to 
satisfy economic, physical and technical aspects of 
grain marketing. 
•  managing the  integration  of marketing  policy  and 
price policy-in particular, how marketing policies 
should be directed to distributional objectives. 
Ultimately,  price  and  marketing  policies  are  the 
outcome of the  interaction of political  and economic 
factors.  A  critical  factor  in  designing  pricing  and 
marketing  institutions  will  be  the  mechanisms 
available  to  achieve  price  and  income  objectives. 
China  has  limited  capacity  to  use  the  taxation  and 
social security systems to achieve transfers of income 
to farmers  and  other groups. This  is  not  the  case  in 
Australia.  While  analysis  of  grain  marketing  in 
Australia  provides  many  insights,  the  comparison 
should not be pushed too far.  Income transfers can be 
readily  undertaken  in  Australia.  There  is  no need to 
intervene  in  the  grain  marketing  system  to  provide 
direct  income  support.  Food  security  is  not  an 
important objective because such a high proportion of 
agricultural output is exported. 
The claim  on  income of a  high  proportion  of the 
Chinese population is tied to employment in grain pro-
duction and consumption of their own output.  Insta-
bility  of  prices  and  production  therefore  have 
immediate and severe consequences for producers and 
consumers.  Finding  ways  of stabilising  prices  and 
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incomes will have high priority. Australian experience 
of wheat  stabilisation  provides  little  encouragement 
that  managed  programs  provide  all  the  answers.  As 
pointed  out  by  Schmitz  (1984),  liberalised  trade 
reduces  the  need  for  buffer  stocks  held  for  food 
security  because  trade  has  a  stabilising  effect.  This 
applies to both inter-regional and international trade. 
In a sense, trade has  similar effects to price-stabil-
ising speculation through buffer stocks. That is, trade 
is  also  a  means  by  which  individuals,  firms  and 
countries  can  engage  in  'buying  cheap  and  selling 
dear', through economic transactions,  rather than  by 
shifting stocks over time. 
The  complexity  of production,  consumption  and 
marketing of grain  and  the  diversity  of information 
required to make marketing decisions, mean that the 
most important policy decisions concern the allocation 
of  grain  marketing  functions  between  public  and 
private  organisations.  Not  all  grain  marketing 
functions  lend  themselves  to  unfettered operation of 
private  enterprise  and  the  price  mechanism.  Grain 
storage has economic characteristics leading to local 
monopoly:  to  the  disadvantage of farmers.  with  the 
danger  of excessive  prices  being  charged  to  con-
sumers. Some form of regulation is required to control 
margins  and  ensure  competition  in  the  supply  of 
storage  services.  In  many  circumstances,  public  or 
cooperative  supply  of storage  may  be  necessary  to 
protect producers and consumers. 
In  addition,  some  marketing  activities  which  are 
perceived  as  exclusively  in  the  domain  of private 
enterprise in  market economies could just as sensibly 
be  described  as  regulated.  For  example,  futures 
exchanges  closely  supervise  the  behaviour  of their 
members to ensure pmdential operation. Government 
agencies also exercise controls on futures markets. As 
discussed  above,  margin  deposits  and  margin  calls 
were  a  cmcial  innovation  to  ensure  that  futures 
markets are a successful risk  management and  price 
discovery  device.  However,  futures  markets  do  not 
intluence  the  economic  forces  that  determine  grain 
prices. Futures markets allow marketing services to be provided more efficiently but their role in influencing 
the  absolute  price of grain  is  negligible.  While  the 
development of futures  markets  in  China should be 
encouraged.  their  economic  effects  should  not  be 
exaggerated. 
The importance of institutions concerned with  the 
generation  and  distribution  of  information  for  a 
well-functioning market economy have been graphi-
cally described by Intriligator (1993) in the context of 
the acute problems faced by the Russian economy in 
its  faltering  transition, following the abandonment of 
central planning. 
The basic transaction of a market economy is extremely 
simple:  one  economic  actor,  i.e .•  an  individual  or an 
entrepreneur wants to sell something and another wants 
to  buy this commodity. so they  make a mutually  prof-
itable  transaction.  This  is  multiplied  an  astronomical 
number of times in  a market economy. What provides 
for such a microeconomic transaction? First, the buyer 
and seller must know what they own and what they can 
buy.  making  necessary  a  system  of property  rights. 
Second. the seller must know about the ex istence of the 
buyer.  This  requires  advertising,  especially  classified 
advertising, and other infonnation systems. Third, there 
must be a way offormalizing the transaction and settling 
disputes, necessitating a system of contracts. laws, com-
mercial  codes.  etc.  Fourth,  a  banking  and  financial 
system is  required to finance  the  transaction. Fifth. an 
insurance system is unavoidable so as to insure what is 
bought and sold. Sixth. an accounting system. Seventh. 
barter transactions should be avoided if possible, which 
requires money. both as a unit of  account and as a means 
of payment. 
The simple analytical rule which describes the spatial 
organisation  of production  in  competitive  markets  is 
that  price  differences  cannot  exceed  transfer  costs 
(Tomek  and  Robinson  1981,  p,  151).  Arbitrage  will 
occur until  it  is no longer profitable to shift production 
between  markets.  The  consequence  for  marketing 
policy  is  that  anything  that  lowers  transfers  costs 
enhances trade and offers the prospect of second-round 
gains from further regional specialisation. 
The  development  of  institutions  to  provide 
economic  information  to  producers.  consumers  and 
marketing  enterprises  is  crucial  to  the  efficiency  of 
agricultural  marketing,  In  the  first  instance, 
price-reporting  services  which  make  information  on 
regional price differentials and transport costs readily 
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available would encourage growth of trade and  spe-
cialisation. Moreover, price-reporting services are an 
important  ingredient  in  ensuring  that  a  reasonable 
degree of competition exists in the supply of marketing 
services. As stated, parts of the grain marketing system 
are  vulnerable  to  anti-competitive  behaviour,  Wide-
spread  dissemination  of economic  information  can 
provide some protection against monopolistic actions 
by marketing agencies. 
Research  on  transport  policy  is  one  of the  most 
useful activities that could be undertaken to improve 
the efficiency of grain marketing in China. Not that it 
should be presumed that greater trade should be sought 
per  se.  Expansion  of domestic  trade  in  grain  will 
require  a  major  investment  in  transport  and  other 
marketing infrastructure, In  particular, grain transport 
and storage is characterised by  an  inherent peak load 
problem because of seasonal harvests, It is necessary 
to  consider carefully  investment  in  capital  facilities 
which are used intermittently. 
Australian  experience  is  that  internal  (land) 
transport charges amount to about 25% of the seaboard 
or  [o,b value  of grain,  and  sea  transport  charges 
another 25% of the landed or c.Lf. value at major desti-
nations.  Transport  and  associated  handling  costs 
account  for a high  proportion  of the  value added  in 
Australia's  participation  in  the  world  grain  trade, 
There are  no policy issues of concern to either grain 
exporters  or grain  importers  with  respect  to  ocean 
transport,  because  rates  are  determined  so competi-
tively.  The  difficult  questions  are  with  respect  to 
domestic carriage of grain. 
On  this  score,  China  faces  interesting  policy 
questions  with  respect  to  transport,  which  are 
amenable to quantitative economic analysis. The basic 
choice  that  has  to  be  made  with  respect  to  grain 
transport  policy  is  the  emphasis  to  be  given  to 
transport of  by various modes. In Australia, the 
debate  has  concerned  road  versus  rail  transport.  In 
China,  the  choices  include  transporting  grain  from 
domestic sources by rail or internal waterways, or from 
external  sources  using  ocean  transport,  Since 
expanding  land  transport  is  going  to  require  capital 
investment, this  is an important economic issue.  Sea 
and water transport are cheaper than rail  transport in 
China, which is in very short supply, Concluding Comments 
Australian  experience  in  grain  marketing  teaches 
several lessons. The most obvious consequence of inter-
vention and orderly marketing in the Australian wheat 
industry  for  the  thirty  years  following  1948 was  that 
producers received prices which were not closely related 
to  world  market prices.  Moreover,  marketing costs in 
transport, storage and handling were much higher than 
justified.  With  considerable  patience  and  effort,  the 
marketing system has gradually been reformed. 
Government intervention, without careful attention to 
its effects on the marketing system, may easily impose 
costs on  producers, consumers and the economy  as  a 
whole.  One  of the  key  lessons  was  summarised  by 
Miller and White (1980, p. 2) who observed that wheat 
marketing in Australia has been characterised by a 'con-
fusion of objectives pursued in much of post-war wheat 
stabilisation policy'. The objectives were a mixture of 
income, price, production and national goals that were 
not always consistent and were easily perverted by con-
voluted political processes. 
The story of  grain marketing in Australia is a story of 
gradual  change  in  the  direction  of  deregulation. 
Whether  the  A  WB  is  moving  in  the  direction  of 
becoming a private grain  trading company along  the 
lines of the  multinational  grain trading houses is  the 
next major question being considered (Malcolm 1994). 
It is  an  interesting  technical  question  in  financial 
economics  whether an  organisation  which  is  essen-
tially  engaged  in  trading  can  be  privatised  in  the 
manner of a joint stock company. There is  no logical 
basis on which the assets of trading organisations could 
be  calculated  by  those outside  the  organisation.  The 
main  asset  of a  trading  organisation  is  information 
about markets, the  value of which is ephemeral. Nor 
would it be easy for control of salaried management to 
be exercised at  a distance by  dispersed grower share-
holders.  In  fact,  the  large trading houses in the grain 
industry are often family-controlled companies. 
It  seems  likely  that  the  fragile  interstate  alliances 
between wheat growers on which the past history of 
wheat growing and wheat marketing were based would 
prove  fragile  with the creation of a privatised A  WB. 
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Regional differences between producers remain a key 
issue for the Australian grain industry.  Local  differ-
ences with respect to access to export markets will be 
most difficult to reconcile without the backing of  legis-
lated powers. 
In  the  Australian case, one of the  most  important 
lessons from  the history of grain marketing is  that the 
marketing  system  is  not  an  effective  means  of 
achieving  objectives  with  respect  to  income  distri-
bution.  Because of the differences  in  the  production 
system and institutional arrangements, the same con-
clusion does not necessarily apply to China, although 
it  is an issue that should be kept uppermost in framing 
government policy. 
Productivity and economic efficiency are not easy 
concepts to come to terms with in the study of agricul-
tural marketing. Normally productivity is thought of in 
terms  of relationships  between  inputs  and  outputs. 
Measures  of  productivity  may  be  partial  or  total. 
Another way  of thinking  about the  same issue  is  in 
terms  of benefits  and  costs.  Approaches  based  on 
measurement  of  marketing  performance  can  be 
applied  to  parts  of the  marketing  system.  At  times, 
technical  measures  of  efficiency  and  comparative 
analysis will make sense. 
The main  test that has to be  applied to marketing 
efficiency in  a market economy concerns the ease of 
entry and exit of t1rms into the grain marketing system. 
The flexibility of the marketing system in terms of the 
ability to reorganise itself, vertically and horizontally, 
also  needs  to  be  considered.  The  efficiency  of the 
marketing system cannot be judged simply by  meas-
urement  of  marketing  margins  and  comparisons 
between  products,  between time periods  or between 
locations. 
What has to be attempted is a study of market per-
formance analysing the rate ofreturn or profitability of 
firn1s  providing marketing services. The best guide is 
the  ease  of entry  and  exit  of firms  since  this  will 
indicate the chance of  excessive profits persisting. The 
study  of marketing  efficiency  in  publiC  marketing 
enterprises creates even greater challenges. The  two  principal  conclusions of this  paper with 
respect  to  the  development  of the  grain  marketing 
system  in  China  are  that  most  attention  should  be 
given  to  the  provision  of market  information  and 
issues  concerning  grain  transport,  handling  and 
storage.  While  improvements  in  market  information 
can be achieved at relatively low cost and yield sub-
stantial benefits, the problems of transport and related 
activities are more difficult. This is  because the costs 
of providing these parts of the marketing infrastructure 
are substantial and many of the specialised assets have 
few  alternative  uses.  Efficient  utilisation  of capital 
embodied in the grain marketing system is a key issue. 
Even  more fundamentally, analysis of issues to  do 
with  transport,  handling  and  storage  is  important 
44 
because  performance  of  these  grain  marketing 
functions is  most likely to be characterised by  uneven 
distribution  of  market  power  between  producers, 
consumers  and  marketing  enterprises.  Policymakers 
obviously need to be concerned with the distribution of 
the benefits of marketing reform, not only for reasons 
of maintaining  equity  between  the  different  groups 
affected. Unless the benefits of investment in transport 
and  related  infrastructure  are  shared  with  producers 
and consumers, the  full  benefits of marketing reform 
cannot  be  realised  through  second-round effects  on 
production and processing of  grain products. References 
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